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ESSAY 
'TIS A GIFI' TO BE SIMPLE: AESTHETICS 
AND PROCEDURAL REFORM 
Janice Toran* 
If a poet could at the same time be a physicist, he might convey to others 
the pleasure, the satisfaction, almost the reverence which the subject in-
spires. The aesthetic side of the subject is, I confess, by no means the 
least attractive to me. 
Albert A. Michelson 1 
A philosopher of science, after examining the papers of Albert Ein-
stein, recently reasserted what other scholars had long believed to be 
true: Einstein developed his theory of relativity at least partly for aes-
thetic reasons.2 In his first relativity paper in 1905, Einstein was con-
cerned with unifying, simplifying, and rationalizing the physical 
world. He expressed dismay over "asymmetries" in the subfields of 
physics and sought a general principle to reconcile and unify them. 3 
Einstein believed that scientific theories must not only be verified em-
pirically but also must possess inner perfection, a quality encompass-
ing both naturalness and logical simplicity, in order to mirror more 
closely the natural universe.4 He rejected certain theories contradic-
tory to his own, not because they were mathematically unsound, but 
because they produced inelegant, disorderly results. 5 In fact, Einstein 
• Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. B.A. 1969, Smith College; J.D. 1974, 
Northeastern University. - Ed. This essay is dedicated to the memory of Evelyn I. Toran. I 
wish to acknowledge with gratitude the financial support of the Cleveland-Marshall Fund and to 
thank the staff of the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, England, for 
providing a congenial and stimulating environment for writing this piece. I am also grateful to 
Professors Peter Garloek, Lynne Henderson, Marjorie Kornhauser, Stephan Landsman, and Ste-
phen Subrin and to Peter Toran for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. 
1. A. MICHELSON, LIGHT WAVES AND THEIR USES 1 (1903). In 1887, Albert Michelson 
and Edward Morley conducted an experiment, the result of which forced scientists to discard the 
widely-held belief that empty space was filled with an ether through which light passed. The 
Michelson-Morley experiment cleared the way for Albert Einstein's Theory of Relativity. 
2. See G. HOLTON, THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, AND ITS BURDENS 77-91 (1986). 
3. Einstein was particularly concerned about asymmetries between mechanics on the one 
hand and electrodynamics and optics on the other. By uniting previously separate concepts and 
applying them in all parts of physics, Einstein placed the subfields of physics on an equal footing. 
Id. at 88-89 (citing Einstein, Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Ko'rper, ANNALEN DER PHYSIK ser. 
4, 17 (1905)); see also H. MARGENAU, OPEN VISTAS 93-101 (1961) (demonstrating the impact of 
aesthetics on the development of relativity theory). 
4. G. HOLTON, supra note 2, at 74-76, 85. 
5. Id. at 71-72." 
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allegedly gave a lecture at Princeton in which he asserted that the laws 
of physics should be simple. When asked by someone in the audience, 
"But what if they are not simple?" he replied, "Then I would not be 
interested in them.''6 
The quest for the simple and elegant solution pervades the history 
of science. In his classic work, The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions, 7 Thomas Kuhn describes the role of aesthetic considerations in 
replacing an old scientific paradigm with a new one: 
[T]here is also another sort of consideration that can lead scientists to 
reject an old paradigm in favor of a new. These are the arguments, 
rarely made entirely explicit, that appeal to the individual's sense of the 
appropriate or the aesthetic - the new theory is said to be "neater," 
"more suitable," or "simpler'' than the old.8 
Of course, paradigm shifts are not invariably based on aesthetic fac-
tors. A new paradigm may solve problems insoluble under the old 
paradigm, or it may predict phenomena totally unsuspected under the 
old paradigm - in short, the new paradigm may simply work better 
than the old. But where proof is impossible or premature, Kuhn con-
siders aesthetic considerations decisive.9 Aesthetic considerations en-
courage supporters of the new paradigm, even in the absence of 
empirical proof, to attempt to convince the rest of the scientific com-
munity to choose a new guiding principle. The tenacity of these early 
supporters is sometimes based only on personal and inarticulable aes-
thetic considerations. Indeed, Kuhn points out that "[m]en have been 
converted by [aesthetic considerations] ... when most of the articul-
able technical arguments pointed the other way .... Even today Ein-
stein's general theory attracts men principally on aesthetic grounds, an 
appeal that few people outside of mathematics have been able to 
feel."Io 
The aesthetic appeal of simplicity extends beyond science. Its 
force is particularly evident among reformers, including those who 
would promote a new social, political, or economic order. Eighteenth-
6. Id. at 74 (recounting anecdote recorded by John A. Wheeler). 
7. T. KUHN, THE STRUcrtJRE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2 International Encyclopedia 
of Unified Science No. 2, 2d ed. 1970). 
8. Id. at 155. 
9. Id. at 156. 
10. Id. at 158. Other philosophers of science take the view that scientific progress is evolu-
tionary, not revolutionary, in nature. Gerald Holton, for example, maintains that scientific inno-
vations do not require the "complete and sudden reorientation" implied by the revolution model 
but are instead part of an evolutionary process. Einstein apparently saw himself as part of an 
evolutionary chain, working on modifications of earlier theories. See G. HOLTON, supra note 2, 
at 26-27, 101..03; see also D. HULL, SCIENCE AS A PROCESS: AN EVOLUTIONARY ACCOUNT OF 
THE SOCIAL AND CoNCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE 432-76 (1988) (demonstrating that 
science is an evolutionary process). 
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century political reformer Thomas Paine, for example, elevated siin-
plicity to the status of a compelling first principle, stating: "I draw my 
idea of the form of government from a principle in nature which no art 
can overturn, viz. that the more siinple any thing is, the less liable it is 
to be disordered, and the easier repaired when disordered .... "11 
Like reformers in other realms, law reformers12 are also drawn to 
, siinple, elegant solutions, not only because such solutions may prove 
more workable but also, one suspects, because they are more aestheti-
cally pleasing tha.Il more complicated altematives.13 This attraction of 
the siinple is evident in some of the positions taken by certain nine-
teenth-century law reformers who criticized the common law writ sys-
tem, particularly its use of fictional allegations to encompass new 
disputes within existing forms of action.14 Yet the writ system, 
although not perfect, worked reasonably well and evolved in such a 
way that most disputes were heard.15 For the critics, however, an in-
strumental defense of the common law was inadequate; theirs was an 
aesthetic vision of an ideal system at once complete, spare, and scien-
tific. Even if the old system had worked perfectly, its use of fictional 
pleadings could not be tolerated because such a practice spoiled the 
11. T. PAINE, Common Sense, in 2 THE LIFE AND WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE 102 (W. Van 
der Weyde ed. 1925). Paine used simplicity in other contexts as well. For example, in response 
to the question, "Which is the easiest and most practicable plan, RECONCILIATION [with 
England] or INDEPENDENCE?" Paine noted: 
He who takes nature for his guide, is not easily beaten out of his argument, and on that 
ground, I answer generally - That Independence being a single simple line, contained 
within ourselves; and reconciliation, a matter exceedingly perplexed and complicated, and in 
which a treacherous capricious court is to interfere, gives the answer without a doubt 
Id. at 172, 175. 
12. In America, law reform usually refers to improvement in the formal parts of law. See 
Friedman, Law Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 ST. LoUJS U. L.J. 351, 352-54 (1969). Law 
reform includes, among other things, revision of statutes, codification of doctrines, improvements 
in the court system, and simplification of the administration of justice. Id. at 354. 
13. Professor Robert Gordon has noted both a tendency toward simplicity and an aesthetic 
orientation among law reformers favoring codification. In addition, he suggests that simple rules 
may also be attractive because they preserve the position and power of their elite drafters. 
Gordon observes that codification is not inherently democratic, but rather notes that it has been 
"the instrument of despotic authority striving to enforce its will through plain, succinct rules; 
and ••• the program of academic lawyers with the largely aesthetic aim of achieving elegant/a 
juris." Gordon, Book Review, 36 V AND. L. REv. 431, 443 (1983). Regarding the drafting of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Professor Emeritus Benjamin Kaplan has observed that 
Charles Clark, Reporter to the Advisory Committee that drafted the Rules, "seemed to think 
that rulemaking was really for the coterie of experts, though some concessions should be made 
toward informing the public (preferably after the event)." Kaplan, Comment on Corrington, 137 
U. PA. L. REv. 2125, 2128 (1989). 
14. See, e.g., C. HEPBURN, THE HlsTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CoDE PLEADING JN 
AMERICA AND ENGLAND § 45 (1897); see also J. POMEROY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL 
RJGIITS BY THE C1vJL ACI10N ACCORDING TO THE REFORMED AMERICAN PROCEDURE 
§§ 521-22 (2d ed. 1883). 
15. See Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute.· Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure 
from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 20-21 n.41 (1989). 
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simple and elegant shape of an ideal system.16 
Procedural reform illustrates with special clarity the aesthetic 
quest for simplicity. Perhaps this should not be surprising: procedure 
bears some relationship to science, and the link between aesthetic con-
siderations and scientific progress is well-documented. Like the math-
ematical or scientific formula in its pure, unapplied state, procedural 
systems and procedural rules have a formal structure of their own.17 
Procedures can thus be perceived in the abstract, quite apart from 
their application. As a matter of form, a procedure may be deemed 
"elegant'' or "simple" or "coherent." Of course, this analogy only 
goes so far. In seeking the simple, scientists attempt to reflect the or-
der of the natural universe; however, no such order is present in the 
world of human affairs, the world with which procedure concerns it-
self. Nevertheless, like science, procedure may be appreciated for its 
formal qualities, even if that appreciation is sometimes misplaced. 
This essay advances the hypothesis that aesthetic considerations 
play a role in the formulation of new legal procedures and the prefer-
ence for one procedure over another. Of course, other considerations 
like the social impact of a particular procedure or procedural system, 
its economic consequences, and its role within existing legal institu-
tions are important, often decisive, factors influencing procedural 
choice. My argument is simply that additional unarticulated and un-
recognized aesthetic considerations also play a role in the procedural 
reform process. I refer to these elements as "aesthetic" because they 
focus on the formal qualities of a procedure (simplicity, elegance, co-
herence, and the like) rather than the results of applying that 
procedure. 
What makes a human response or reaction aesthetic is difficult to 
16. Professor Bone summarizes the nineteenth-century jurists' attitude toward the common 
law writ system: 
Any system that relied on fiction was simply "unscientific" - and therefore bad. The label 
"technicality" was often used to denote features of the positive law that failed to conform to 
the rights-based ideal. A "technicality" might be inconsistent with the general principles of 
the ideal, or it might be superfluous, that is, it might not serve any purpose at all within an 
ideal legal system and thus be expendable. Both defects were bad. An ideal system was not 
only internally consistent but it was also spare; it contained only those elements that were 
necessary to its operation . 
. . . In short, nineteenth century critics evaluated the common law not only on the basis 
of the outcomes that it generated, but also the shape it assumed. A good system not only 
operated like a scientific theory; it looked like one as well. 
Id. 
17. This abstracted vision of procedure tends to obscure the inevitable link between proce-
dure and substance. See, e.g., Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of 
the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 722-40 (1975); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 909, 929-31 (1987). 
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define with precision and I have not presumed to do so.18 I have de-
veloped, however, some parameters for understanding the issues and 
language of aesthetics. In Part I, I develop a philosophical framework 
for considering the influence of aesthetic considerations on procedural 
reform. Next, in Part II, I examine how legal scholars have written 
about or made reference to aesthetics. Using categories and definitions 
gleaned from these two sources, in Part III I then identify and discuss 
aesthetic elements in the writings of a number of procedural reform-
ers. Particularly noticeable is the attraction of several generations of 
reformers to procedural simplicity - an attraction that I suggest is 
partly aesthetic. 
In Part IV, I conclude that a consciousness of the role of aesthetics 
in procedural formulation and choice is important. An aesthetic per-
ception of procedure may spur valuable innovation: as in Kuhn's 
model of scientific revolution, proponents of a new order must some-
times cling tenaciously to their beliefs only on the strength of unarticu-
lated aesthetic considerations. On the other hand, a view of procedure 
"for its own sake" may blind proponents to the social and institutional 
effects of a procedure or procedural system. In particular, the pre-
dominance of a single aesthetic vision can distort the way that proce-
dure operates in fact. To assume, for example, that simpler 
procedures are always better is to overlook the disorderly and compli-
cated world in which procedures must operate. This world contrasts 
sharply with the ordered simplicity of the natural universe. Thus, 
while Einstein could justifiably insist that the laws of physics be simple 
to mirror the natural perfection of the universe, simplicity alone may 
not justify a legal procedure. A procedure must function in the cha-
otic world of human transactions. Judged against this instrumental, 
nonaesthetic criterion, simpler procedures may not always be better. 
The process of formulating and choosing procedures may never be 
free of aesthetic considerations, nor should it be. The human tradition 
of striving toward a world which inspires and pleases us is a venerable 
one. Nevertheless, bringing an awareness of aesthetic components to 
the surface may help to ensure that the role of aesthetics is controlled 
and positive. Such an awareness may also encourage the development 
of alternative aesthetic visions, less dependent on simplicity and more 
reflective of the complexity of human interactions, 19 on which to build 
future reforms. 
18. Even philosophers who specialize in aesthetics have diverse views about the nature of 
aesthetic experience. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra note 279. 
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I. AEsTHETICS AS PHILOSOPHY 
Aesthetics is a distinct branch of philosophy concerned with the 
contemplation of aesthetic objects and resulting concepts and issues. 
This branch studies "a rather heterogeneous collection of problems: 
those that arise when we make a serious effort to say something true 
and warranted about a work of art. "20 One philosopher terms aesthet-
ics "the philosophy of criticism, or metacriticism" because "[a]s a field 
of knowledge, aesthetics consists of those principles that are required 
for clarifying and confirming critical statements."21 Not surprisingly, 
philosophers have utilized numerous approaches to the many issues 
that aesthetics encompasses. 22 
One need not consider the entire range of aesthetics issues to ex-
tract a framework for analyzing aesthetic elements in procedural for-
mulation and choice. I have isolated two questions for examination: 
"What does it mean to view something aesthetically?" and "What 
sorts of observations are aesthetic?" 
A. The Aesthetic Attitude 
Many philosophers believe that an aesthetic way of looking at 
things differs from other ways of experiencing these things. Some de-
scribe this aesthetic attitude as detached or disinterested: to view 
something aesthetically, one must focus only on the aesthetic object 
and its properties without reference to external factors such as the per-
son who created the object or the culture of which the object is a 
part. 23 This intense concentration produces "the kind of admiring 
20. M. BEARDSLEY, AEsnmTICS: PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF CRITICISM 3 (1958). 
21. Id. at 3-4. The philosophy of art is a subset of aesthetics, concerned with issues that arise 
in connection with works of art and excluding the aesthetic experience pf other types of objects. 
Art criticism is distinguishable from aesthetics because it is concerned with critical analysis and 
evaluation of works of art. while aesthetics seeks to elucidate the concepts involved in such criti-
cal judgments. Hospers, Problems of Aesthetics, in 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 35, 
36 (P. Edwards ed. 1967). 
22. There are, for example, those who maintain that in order to appreciate a work of art one 
must view it on its own, without any reference to surrounding circumstances. See, e.g., C. BELL, 
ART 25-30 (1913). In contrast, contextualists, as the name implies, believe that appreciation of 
works of art is enhanced by knowledge of context, including history, the artist's intention, the 
artist's biography, and other works by the same artist. See Hospers, supra note 21, at 44-45. 
Another dichotomy exists between the formalist theory of art. which considers only formal 
properties of visual art relevant to aesthetic experience, and the expression theory, which main-
tains that a work of art must be expressive and that representation, emotion, and ideas can be 
legitimate aspects of aesthetic experience. See, e.g., R. FRY, VISION AND DESIGN (rev. ed. 1923) 
(formalist theory); c. DUCASSE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART (1929) (expressionist theory). Refer-
ring to the disarray in the field, one writer comments: "Indeed, aesthetics has long been con-
temptuously regarded as a stepsister within the philosophical family. ·Her rejection is easy to 
explain, and partially excused, by the lack of tidiness in her personal habits and by her unwilling-
ness to make herself generally useful around the house." M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 20, at 11. 
23. See Hospers, supra note 21, at 37. 
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contemplation, without any necessary commitment to practical action, 
that is characteristic of aesthetic experience. "24 
The aesthetic attitude is different from the practical attitude, which 
is concerned only with an object's utility. In contrast, the aesthetic 
attitude requires looking at something for its own sake: it is "the artis-
tic attitude of pure vision abstracted from necessity ."25 Aesthetician 
Monroe Beardsley observes: . 
For example, you might say that there are at least two ways of re-
garding an apple. You might take a "practical" interest in it: you might 
want to judge its economic value, or worminess, or estimate the success 
of an apple harvest, and so on; that would be taking the apple as a clue 
for the manipulation of the physical environment. Or you might be in-
terested only in savoring its "surface qualities," its color, texture, and 
taste. If you approach it in the latter way, it is for you, at that time, and 
in that respect, an aesthetic object. An analogous distinction can be 
made with respect to, say, Darwin's Origin of Species. If you are inter-
ested in learning facts about natural and artificial selection, or the his-
tory of biological theory, you are taking a practical attitude. But, if you 
wish, you can read it as an enormously patient and sustained argument, 
or as a masterpiece of style, or· as the record of a dedicated and selfless 
pursuit of an important truth about the world. In that case, you are after 
its "aesthetic qualities," and considering it not qua biological treatise, 
but qua literary work. 26 
The aesthetic attitude also differs from both the cognitive attitude, 
which views an object with the aim of analyzing it and thereby increas-
ing knowledge, and the personal attitude, through which a viewer con-
siders an object only in relation to himself. Like the practical way of 
looking at things, both the cognitive and personal attitudes may be 
highly desirable and may produce important insights; they simply are 
not aesthetic. For example, a student may look at a building and iden-
tify its architectural style and time and place of construction. This 
cognitive approach is quite different from enjoying the experience of 
simply viewing the building "for its own sake."27 Similarly, the man 
who goes to see a performance of Othello and thinks only of the simi-
larity of Othello's situation to his own real life situation, rather than 
concentrating on the play itself, is not viewing the play aesthetically.28 
Despite the seemingly exclusive focus of aesthetics on works of art, 
philosophers generally contend that aesthetic experience is not limited 
to works of art. Even Beardsley, 'who restricts his definition of "aes-
24. M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 20, at 529. 
25. R. FRY, supra note 22, at 25. 
26. M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 20, at 62. 
27. See Hospers, supra note 21, at 36. 
28. Id. at 37. 
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thetic object" to works of art,29 admits that "quite often ae8thetic ex-
periences of some degree of magnitude are obtained in the regular 
course of life from other things than aesthetic objects."3° Further-
more, aesthetic attention is not necessarily limited to perceptual ob-
jects in the physical sense, that is, to objects that can be seen or 
heard.31 One can also appreciate abstract entities aesthetically; litera-
ture, which consists of meanings rather than sounds or marks on pa-
per, is an example of an aesthetic object that is not strictly perceptual. 
In this regard, one writer comments: 
When we enjoy or appreciate the elegance of a mathematical proof, it 
would surely seem that our enjoyment is aesthetic, although the object of 
that enjoyment is not perceptual at all: it is the complex relation among 
abstract ideas or propositions, not the marks on paper or the blackboard, 
that we are apprehending aesthetically. It would seem that the apprecia-
tion of neatness, elegance, or economy of means is aesthetic whether it 
occurs in a perceptual object (such as a sonata) or in an abstract entity 
(such as a logical proof), and if this is so, the range of the aesthetic 
cannot be limited to the perceptual. 32 
B. Aesthetic Value 
In attempting to identify when critical statements refer to aesthetic 
value, I rely heavily on the work of Monroe Beardsley, whose theory 
of aesthetic value helps in classifying responses as aesthetic. While 
recognizing that other schools of aesthetic thought might approach 
29. M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 20, at 63-65. 
30. Id. at 530. Beardsley prefers an objective definition of "aesthetic object" based, first, on 
dividing perceptual objects according to their sensory fields ("some are seen, some heard"). 
Then, within these fields, he makes further distinctions - musical composition, for example, is 
distinguished from bird song and only the former is an aesthetic object. Id. at 63-64. Aesthetic 
objects produce aesthetic experiences of "the highest magnitude" and do so "most dependably." 
Id. at 530. Nevertheless, Beardsley allows that "sometimes people will use perceptual objects 
that are not aesthetic objects by our definition as if they were aesthetic objects, and sometimes 
these objects serve moderately well in this unexpected capacity." Id. at 63. Others take a 
broader view of art as anything that generates aesthetic experience. See Kostelanetz, Contempo-
rary American Esthetics, in Esnmncs CoNTEMPORARY 26-29 (R. Kostelanetz ed. 1978). 
31. See Hospers, supra note 21, at 38-39. Some attempts have been made to exclude smell, 
taste and touch as inappropriate for aesthetic attention. Id. at 39. 
32. Id. at 38. Beardsley agrees that a mafl!ematical proof or scientific investigation may 
produce an aesthetic experience but continues to tie that experience to the perceptual: 
Carrying through a triumphant scientific investigation or the solution of a mathematical 
problem may have the clear dramatic pattern and consummatory conclusion of an aesthetic 
experience, but it is not itself aesthetic experience unless the movement of thought is tied 
closely to sensuous presentations, or at least a phenomenally objective field of perceptual 
objects. 
M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 20, at 530. It should be noted that some philosophers deny the 
existence of a unique aesthetic attitude, pointing instead to aesthetic reasons for critical judg-
ments. See Hospers, supra note 21, at 39. My approach in this essay follows the more traditional 
view, acknowledging the existence of an aesthetic attitude. The process of understanding and 
identifying such an attitude seems to me to be useful in clarifying the relationship between aes-
thetics and law. 
360 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:352 
the issues raised lietein differently, I have chosen Beardsley's approach 
as a structuring mechanism because of its accessibility and clarity. 
Beardsley takes what may be called an objectivist approach to aes-
thetic value; he maintains that the properties that constitute aesthetic 
value are properties of the object itself. 33 Beardsley has attempted to 
organize and categorize statements of aesthetic value. These catego-
ries help to clarify and illustrate what it means to make a statement of 
aesthetic value, as opposed to, for example, social, political, or eco-
nomic value. 34 
Beardsley devises his criteria for judging aesthetic value by exam-
ining the nature of critical judgment and identifying the various types 
of reasons given in support of critical evaluations. Those reasons re-
ferring to the features of the aesthetic object itself are called objective 
reasons and fall into three main groups: (1) those that bear upon the 
unity or disunity of the work; (2) those that bear upon the degree of 
complexity or simplicity of the work; and (3) those that bear upon the 
intensity or lack of intensity of the work. These categories are ex-
amined below. 
1. Unity 
Beardsley identifies two components of unity: completeness and 
coherence. Completeness is a simple quality, not analyzable into sim-
pler qualities. To say that an object has completeness "is to say that it 
33. Theories of aesthetic value may be subjectivist or objectivist. Subjectivist theory main· 
tains that aesthetic value derives from the reactions of aesthetic consumers; in contrast, objectiv-
ist theory holds that aesthetic value inheres in properties of the aesthetic object itself. One type 
of subjectivist theory posits that statements of aesthetic value ("Xis aesthetically good/bad") are 
actually only claims of taste ("I like it I I don't like it"). This approach is problematic for a 
number of reasons. First, it confuses autobiographical judgments with statements of aesthetic 
value. A person may "like" a painting, for example, without thinking it aesthetically "good," or 
vice versa. Second, the subjectivist view makes disagreement on aesthetic matters impossible. 
Claims of taste are likely to be true; people are unlikely to lie about their likes and dislikes. Thus, 
if the person who says "Xis good" merely means "I like X." and the person who says "X is not 
good" merely means "I don't like X." there is no basis for disagreement. Subjectivism thus 
renders criticism arbitrary and absurd. See Dewey, The Meaning of Value, 22 J. PHIL. 126, 131 
(1925); see also Hospers, supra note 21, at 53-54. 
Similar problems arise when "Xis good" is taken to mean that the majority of people, or the 
majority of critics, or the majority of the "best" critics like X. Under this theory, the statement 
"X is good" still tells us more about those who are judging X than it does about X itself. See 
Hospers, supra note 21, at 54. Louis Schwartz appears to rely in part on a consensus approach to 
aesthetic value. See infra note 92; text accompanying notes 77-78. 
Relativism, which attempts to avoid pitfalls of both subjectivism and objectivism, is another 
approach to aesthetic value. For an argument in support of relativism, see B. HEYL, NEW 
BEARINGS IN EsrHETics AND ART CRITICISM 125-55 (1943). For a critique of the relativistic 
method, see M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 20, at 478-89. 
34. As this section illustrates, Beardsley's approach to aesthetic value is one among many, I 
have chosen to present it here in detail, and to utilize it later as a tool for analysis, because it 
allows statements of aesthetic value to be analyzed and opened up for discussion, thus avoiding 
the subjectivist dilemma. See supra note 33. 
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appears to require, or call upon, nothing outside itself; it has all that it 
needs; it is all there."35 Coherence refers to how the parts of an object 
fit together. Beardsley isolates these principles of coherence36 as focus, 
balance, and harmony. 
By focus, Beardsley refers to the dominant pattern or composi-
tional scheme of an object. In the visual arts, the focus "may be that 
part of the painting that has the greatest perceptual strikingness or to 
which the eye is led ... by the convergence of strong lines."37 Beards-
ley's second principle of coherence, balance or equilibrium, connects 
the parts of a whole, and ensures that a design does not disintegrate 
into separate parts. Thus, the problem of connecting two figures in a 
painting is really a problem of creating a balanced and therefore coher-
ent work. Harmony, Beardsley's third touchstone, refers to similari-
ties among the parts of a design. Beardsl~y notes: 
As a rough generalization, we may say that, other things being equal, the 
more similarities there are among the parts of the design, the more co-
herent the design will tend to be. 
Similarity of texture, or, in other words, consistency of style, 
throughout the design, is one of the most powerful perceptual conditions 
of coherence. 38 
2. Complexity 
Complexity is correlative to unity.39 By complexity, Beardsley 
means the number of parts, and the number of differences between 
these parts, within an aesthetic object. Beardsley uses the following 
example to explain his definition: 
Unity and complexity are set over against each other: very broadly 
speaking, the former is increased by similarities of parts, the latter by 
differences. Thus if we take, say, a design of a given sort, with several 
distinguishable areas, we can always change it in two directions. If we 
35. M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 20, at 192. In the representational arts, completeness refers 
to a quality independent of representation. Beardsley uses this example: 
A piece of sculpture that is merely a torso, or even a classic statue with arms or legs missing, 
may be nevertheless quite complete as a design, though from a physiological point of view 
there is evidently something missing. Thus Rodin did not destroy the completeness of his 
statue The Inner Voice - later used for the Victor Hugo monument - when he left off the 
arms because arms, he said, imply action, and action is the enemy of meditation. 
Id. at 193. . 
36. "[S]uch a principle is a statement that, other things being equal, such-and-such a set of 
elements or of relations will tend to produce, or to increase, coherence." Id. at 194. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 195. 
39. Beardsley cautions: "The two notions [complexity and unity] need to be distinguished 
with care, for though the opposite of 'unity' is 'disunity,' and the opposite of 'complexity' is 
'simplicity,' it will occasionally be found that critics use the term 'simplicity' when they mean 
what I have chosen to mean by 'unity.' " Id. at 205. 
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cut down on the variety of color-tones, we will, other things being equal, 
increase its unity but decrease its complexity; if we make every area of a 
different color-tone, we will increase its complexity, but decrease its 
unity.4-0 
3. Intensity 
Beardsley's final objective reason supporting critical evaluation is 
intensity, the requirement that "a good aesthetic object must have 
some marked quality, and not be a sheer nonentity or a zero. The 
quality does not matter - it can be sad or cheerful, graceful or rug-
ged, soft or stem, provided it be something. "41 To praise a painting 
because it exudes a sense of calm and stillness is to praise it for the 
intensity of a certain pervasive quality.42 
Beardsley argues that the concepts of unity, complexity and inten-
sity are broad enough to be deemed General Canons under which all 
objective reasons can be organized. He concludes that all objective 
reasons used in making aesthetic judgments appeal directly or indi-
rectly to these General Canons. Beardsley's justification of this con-
clusion is instructive. 43 He examines cases of critical reasoning and 
demonstrates how each uses the General Canons. Since critics do not 
necessarily use the terms "unity," "complexity," and "intensity," 
Beardsley in effect translates and abstracts these general themes from 
the passages that he examines. For example, a critic who refers to a 
poem as "very tightly organized" and another as "more confused" ap-
peals to the Canon of Unity.44 Similarly, a critical reference to the 
"richness and depth" of a work due to its "imaginative grasp of di-
verse materials" appeals to the Canon of Complexity, as does a refer-
ence to "economy" when it means variety of significance in line and 
shape.45 Generally, references to "dramatic force," "dramatic 
power," and to "energy" invoke the Canon of Intensity.46 
40. Id. at 208. Beardsley extends the use of the terms unity and complexity to the analysis of 
literary works and finds that they can be used in the same sense in this context as when analyzing 
painting or music. Id. at 252-53. 
41. Id. at 463. 
42. Hospers, supra note 21, at 55. 
43. Beardsley summarizes his argument: 
To sum up, the three general critical standards, unity, complexity, and intensity, can be 
meaningfully appealed to in the judgment of aesthetic objects, whether auditory, visual, or 
verbal. Moreover, they are appealed to constantly by reputable critics. It seems to me that 
we can even go so far as to say that all their Objective reasons that have any logical rele-
vance at all depend upon a direct or an indirect appeal to these three basic standards. 
M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 20, at 469-70. 
44. Id. at 466-67. 
45. Id. at 467. 
46. Id. at 467-68. 
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The Canon of Unity is most relevant to the present analysis. It 
subsumes the notion of simplicity that is so prevalent in the writings of 
procedural reformers. Simplicity relates to both the completeness and 
coherence aspects of unity. A simple object is complete because it con-
tains nothing superfluous, is all of one piece, and has everything it 
needs. A simple object is also coherent. Its parts integrate into a har-
monious whole and its disparate elements meld into a single, clear, 
unconfused entity. 
An understanding of these basic philosophical approaches helps to 
clarify the relationship between aesthetics and law. Law may, like a 
mathematical proof, be perceived aesthetically and provide aesthetic 
enjoyment. Critical assessments of a law or a legal system, particu-
larly observations relating to simplicity or complexity, may convey 
judgments of aesthetic value. These insights serve as reference points 
for considering the writings of legal scholars discussed in the next 
section. 
II. AEsTHETICS IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
A number of scholars have recognized the relevance of aesthetics 
to law. Some have used aesthetics explicitly either as a formal mode of 
analysis47 or as a descriptive category.48 Others have employed arts 
metaphors, implicitly invoking aesthetic norms as a way of under-
standing law.49 No single approach to aesthetics prevails, nor does the 
word "aesthetic" itself have a discernible fixed meaning. Philosophi-
cal notions of aesthetics are present in legal scholarship, if at all, only 
as remote and shadowy reference points. Nevertheless, a number of 
writers suggest useful frameworks for applying aesthetics to law. 
In this Part, I examine the use of aesthetics by four legal scholars: 
Robin West, Mark Kelman, Drucilla Cornell, and Louis Schwartz. 
After discussing their writings, I then attempt to distill common 
threads of meaning for use in analyzing the works of procedural 
reformers. 
47. See, e.g., West, Jurisprudence as Na"ative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modem Legal The-
ory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 145 (1985); Kelman, Spitzer and Hoffman on Coase: A Brief Rejoinder, 
53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1215 (1980). 
48. See, e.g., Schwartz, Justice, Expediency, and Beauty, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 141 (1987); 
Cornell, Toward a Modem/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 291 (1985); 
Kelman, The Past and Future of Legal Scholarship, 33 J. LEGAL Eouc. 432, 434 (1983). 
49. See, e.g., Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1656 (1986); Teachout, The Soul 
of the Fugue: An Essay on Reading Fuller, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1073 (1986); L. Weinberg, Law as 
Design: Does Neatness Count? (June 16, 1987) (unpublished manuscript of talk presented at the 
37th Intl. Design Conf., Aspen, Colorado); cf. Clermont, Procedure's Magical Number Three: 
Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CoRNELL L. REV. 1115 (1987) (using cognitive 
psychology as a mechanism for analyzing procedure). 
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Robin West uses aesthetic principles to analyze modem legal theo-
ries. so In particular, she views legal theories as, in part, "aesthetic 
objects" because of their narrative component.st West proceeds to an-
alyze these theories as literature. To approach aesthetics in a direct 
and clearly defined manner, she employs Northrop Frye's Anatomy of 
Criticism. sz In this classic work of literary criticism, Frye developed 
four "aesthetic myths" recurrent in narratives.s3 West first describes 
and then applies these myths to Anglo-American jurisprudence, using 
an aesthetic vocabulary inspired by Frye. Legal theorists are cast as 
narrators who combine either a "comic" or "tragic" vision of the 
world with either a "romantic" or "ironic" theoretical method. Using 
this approach, West is able to characterize the "aesthetic posture" of 
the critical legal studies movement as "dark, ironic comedy, tinged 
with awareness of the demonic"s4 and the "aesthetic stance" of the 
political reactionary as "[r]omantic method coupled with a comic con-
tentment with the present world."ss By contrasting aesthetic analysis 
with both "pure philosophical analysis" and "political rhetoric,"S6 she 
draws powerful conclusions, and calls for an understanding of legal 
theories as art: 
To the extent that legal theory is narrative ... it is also art. Therefore 
we must decide not whether the worlds we envision are true or false, 
right or wrong. Rather, we must decide whether they are attractive or 
repulsive, beautiful or ugly. Our acceptance or rejection of these aes-
thetic visions will in turn influence the historical choices we must make. 
The aesthetic quality of our art, like the quality of our play, deeply af-
fects our lives: our imaginings are not only a part of our present, but a 
way of determining the limits of our future. s1 
Mark Kelman uses aesthetics in a less formally defined, more per-
vasive manner. For example, in replying to a critique of his article on 
the Coase Theorem,ss Kelman contrasts aesthetic and empirical ap-
proaches to the theorem. He implies that his critics have not under-
stood the aesthetic components of his approach and have instead 
SO. See West, supra note 47. 
51. Id. at 146. 
52. N. FRYE, ANATOMY OF CRrrlClSM (1957). 
53. Id. at 151-58. 
54. West, supra note 47, at 155. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 204-09. 
57. Id. at 210-11. 
58. Kelman is responding to Spitzer & Hoffman, A Reply to "Consumption Theory, Produc-
tion Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem," 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1187 (1980), which is a 
critique of Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 
52 S. CAL. L. REv. 669 (1979). 
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insisted on an empirically based analysis: "Even if I could convince 
[my critics] that their 'data' is useless, I sense I would not succeed in 
making a case that is ultimately intended to be as .'aesthetic' as it is 
'empirical.' "59 According to Kelman, the theorem is "a world-creat-
ing expression," not "a world-describing hypothesis."60 He labels this 
·view hermeneutic/aesthetic: "[T]he Coase Theorem is not primarily 
an external statement about a culture or a statement that describes it. 
Rather, it is an internal statement expressing a culture. It is both de-
scription and ideology; a mixture of 'is' and 'ought.' "61 The herme-
neutic/aesthetic view rejects the positivist notion that empirical data 
can potentially falsify or verify the theorem. Instead, this view asserts 
that the Coase Theorem is a story about "a world in which everything 
must have its price.''62 Kelman continues, using aesthetics in a man-
ner nearly identical to that of Robin West: 
As with any story, one's reaction to this one must be in large part aes-
thetic; what human potentials are unfolded and revealed, which ones are 
suppressed? Is it a pretty world the story-tellers picture? To a consider-
able extent, a revealing study of economics must be a study of econo-
mists and the aesthetic pleasure we derive from their construction of a 
world.63 
Elsewhere in his work, Kelman uses the notion of aesthetics in va-
rying contexts with somewhat different shades of meaning. In explain-
ing his dislike of formalist legal scholarship, Kelman focuses on its 
"inelegance."64 He characterizes his negative reaction to certain pol-
icy analysis scholarship as "simply aesthetic: what seems reassuringly 
familiar to some, a comfortable, well-grounded resting place for dis-
cussion, strikes me as numbingly boring and predictable. Not every-
one likes E.T. " 65 When discussing the rules-standards debate in A 
Guide to Critical Legal Studies, 66 Kelman posits that "the rule form 
may always tend to appeal to the substantive individualist because its 
formal virtues match up aesthetically with the virtues he is inclined to 
admire.''67 Rules appeal to "the aesthetics of precision, to the psy-
chology of denial or skeptical pragmatism," while standards appeal to 
"the aesthetics of romantic absolutism, to the psychology of painful 
59. Kelman, supra note 47, at 1215. 
60. Id. at 1223. 
61. Id. at 1220 (footnote omitted). 
62. Id. at 1221. 
63. Id. 
64. Kelman, supra note 48, at 433. 
65. Id. at 434. 
66. M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987). 
67. Id. at 59. 
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involvement in each situation, to the pragmatism that rejects the need 
for highfalutin generalities."68 In an article identifying conscious and 
unconscious constructs pervasive in substantive criminal law, 69 Kel-
man concludes that his role in writing the article "would be largely 
aesthetic" if the constructs he was discussing did not have political 
meaning, if they were only "nonrational filters" enabling human be-
ings to perceive and communicate. 70 He would exercise his aesthetic 
criticisms - to expose the emptiness of rhetoric proclaiming that legal 
results in cases are rational - "on behalf of those who no longer like 
to listen to people making arguments that mask a hidden structure of 
'nonarguments' with insistent, false rigor."71 
Drucilla Cornell describes as aesthetic the commitment necessary 
to reconstruct ethical group life and shape a better future. 72 She con-
trasts the aesthetic aspect of this commitment with "instrumentally 
rational reasons": commitment to a reconstruction of our social world 
is aesthetic because it must be made "without the promise or security 
of a rational guarantee."73 Instead, an aesthetic commitment is based 
on a vision of what we may become. Cornell concludes that "[t]he 
moment of commitment is aesthetic in its orientation. It demands not 
only the capacity for judgment but also the ability to dream of what-is-
not-yet. The ethical cannot be reduced to an aesthetic, but neither can 
it do without an aesthetic. "74 
Lollis Schwartz gives aesthetics yet another shade of meaning in 
his essay Justice, Expediency and Beauty. 75 He proposes "that an im-
portant criterion of justice is aesthetic: a just decision or statute will 
be beautiful in that it fits, is proportionate to, or is 'just right' for its 
setting and era."76 Schwartz contrasts the aesthetic criterion with the 
goal of expediency, which he rejects as a necessary condition for jus-
tice, noting that an expedient law or decision - one that promotes the 
greatest good for the greatest number - may nevertheless be unjust. 77 
Rather than expedient, justice should be "beautiful" in the sense that 
68. Id. at 61. 
69. Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 
591 (1981). 
70. Id. at 671. Kelman considers that the interpretive constructs he identifies may be a vehi-
cle promoting class domination. 
71. Id. 
72. Cornell, supra note 48, at 380. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Schwartz, supra note 48. 
76. Id. 141. 
77. Id. at 145. 
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beauty represents "an abiding aspiration for a quality that transcends 
utility or expediency. It is a quality that evokes in the appropriate 
audience a recognition of rightness, of fittingness according to a com-
plex of psychological, historical, and political background shared by 
that audience."78 To rescue aesthetic justice from the criticism that it 
is hopelessly subjective, Schwartz emphasizes the importance of the 
aesthetic responses of citizen observers79 and admonishes the mass me-
dia to take more seriously its role in shaping citizen attitudes. 80 
No single aesthetics approach emerges from a study of these writ-
ings. The term "aesthetic" is not always used with precision; some 
writers define their use of aesthetic analysis, while others seem to as-
sume that readers have a shared understanding of what aesthetic 
means. Even the same writer may use "aesthetic" to mean one thing 
in one context and something different in another context. Nonethe-
less, several categories of meaning can be distilled from these writings. 
Formal mode of analysis. Aesthetics, as a philosophical discipline, 
has its own literature and language.81 An art critic may apply aes-
thetic principles to a work of art Just as a mathematician may apply a 
theorem to a given problem or a law professor traditional legal analy-
sis to the study of a legal opinion. Used in this way, aesthetics has a 
formal reality, an academic reference point, even though the validity 
or appropriateness of this reference point is open to challenge. 82 
Taste. One characterization of aesthetic response takes the form "I 
like it" or "I don't like it." This kind of response might include an 
inability or a reluctance to discuss the matter further: "I don't know 
why - I just like it" or "I don't want to argue about it - I simply 
don't like it." Such a subjective notion of aesthetics poses a central 
dilemma for Louis Schwartz, who realizes that his vision of justice as 
beautiful prompts the question "beautiful to whom?" He concedes 
that "[w]ithin the single culture of our time and country, the aesthetics 
of some are satisfied only by the orderliness and harmony of Bach; 
others must have the romantic passion of Beethoven, Tschaikovsky, or 
78. Id. at 14546. 
79. Schwartz observes that "[i]f there is a consensus that the regime governs justly, .•• the 
regime will be stable." Id. at 179. 
80. Id. at 181-82. 
81. As with most disciplines, there is controversy within the field of aesthetics about ap-
proaches to basic principles. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
82. The most obvious example of the use of aesthetics as a formal mode of study is Robin 
West's analysis. See West, supra note 47; see also Kelman, supra note 47, at 1219 n.16 (referring 
to Heidegger as a basis for his method of analysis). Louis Schwartz may be paying oblique 
homage to aesthetics as a philosophical discipline when he refers to Keats' and, in particular, 
Aristotle's views on beauty and justice. See Schwartz, supra note 48, at 146. 
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Brahms."83 When Mark Kelman expresses his dislike for a certain 
type of legal scholarship on aesthetic grounds, surely he is asserting his 
taste: "Not everyone likes E.T. "84 These claims of taste are not, on 
the surface, debatable: "you like Bach - I like Beethoven" or "you 
like E.T. - I don't."85 
Transcendent universal qualities. A judgment of aesthetic value 
may go beyond a claim of taste. Robin West's challenge to evaluate 
legal theories in terms of "whether they are attractive or repulsive, 
beautiful or ugly"86 and Mark Kelman's aesthetic approach to the 
Coase Theorem87 refer to notions of the "attractive," "beautiful," or 
"pretty" and their opposites that seem to transcend individual prefer-
ence. When Kelman explains his aversion to formalistic scholarship 
because it is "inelegant," he may be expressing his personal taste but 
he also may be referring to a more universal quality of "elegance" and 
its opposite. 88 Even though Louis Schwartz accepts the existence of 
competing aesthetic judgments, his theory of justice rests on a concept 
of "beauty" that eludes definition, but that "expresses an abiding aspi-
ration for a quality that transcends utility or expediency."89 Unlike 
claims of taste, these transcendent aesthetic values have a universal 
quality; critics can agree that the concept of beauty or elegance exists 
and has certain parameters and this agreement allows them to evaluate 
works more objectively. 
Psychologically determined preference. Some scholars link aesthet-
ics and psychological makeup. For example, Mark Kelman describes 
his vision of the aesthetic element in the rules-standards debate as the 
"aesthetics of precision" to which rules appeal, which is linked to "the 
83. Schwartz, supr~ note 48, at 145. 
84. Kelman, supra note 48, at 434. 
85. One part of Drucilla Cornell's reference to the aesthetic suggests a claim of taste. She 
cautions that "[t]he ethical cannot be reduced to an aesthetic" which might be read as "the 
ethical cannot be reduced to merely a matter of individual taste." See Cornell, supra note 48, at 
380. However, the context of her appeal to an aesthetically based commitment to the reconstruc-
tion of ethical group life more strongly suggests other meanings. See infra text accompanying 
notes 97-100. So too one may read Mark Kelman's theory of the aesthetic dimension of the 
rules-standards debate as an account based on taste (e.g., "certain kinds of people simply like 
rules better''). However, his account relies more clearly on psychology than on nondebatable 
claims of taste. To the extent that psychology determines taste, this may be a distinction without 
a difference. 
86. West, supra note 47, at 210. 
87. "Is it a pretty world the story-tellers picture?" Kelman, supra note 47, at 1221. 
88. Kelman also reacts to perceived hypocrisy: formalists extol elegance but write inele-
gantly. Kelman, supra note 48, at 433. 
89. Schwartz, supra note 48, at 145. Schwartz finds that the Constitution itself identifies 
transcendent values, such as freedom of speech and religion, beyond the reach of legislatures. He 
considers that "the Framers created a hierarchy of values and saved beauty from condemnation 
as a totally subjective criterion of justice." Id. at 147. 
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psychology of denial" and the "aesthetics of romantic absolutism," to 
which standards appeal, is linked to the "psychology of painful in-
volvement in each situation."90 Kelman contends that rules appeal to 
the stereotypically individualistic/masculine person while standards 
appeal to the stereotypically altruistic/feminine person. He inter-
twines the aesthetic and psychological dimensions, asserting, for ex-
ample, that "the rule form may always tend to appeal to the 
substantive individualist because its formal virtues match up aestheti-
cally with the virtues he is inclined to admire."91 Kelman uses psy-
chology not simply to rationalize individual taste but also to 
circumscribe groups of individuals who will respond in an aestheti-
cally similar manner.92 
Noninstrumental viewpoint. Several writers contrast the aesthetic 
point of view with the empirical, rational and instrumental. For ex-
ample, Drucilla Cornell describes as "aesthetic" a commitment to re-
constructing ethical group life made "without the promise or security 
of a rational guarantee,"93 a commitment "that cannot be proven."94 
Louis Schwartz seeks to inject into a definition of justice a notion of 
beauty "that transcends utility or expediency."95 Mark Kelman ap-
proaches the Coase Theorem in a manner "intended to be as 'aesthetic' 
as it is 'empirical.' "96 These writers share the view that an aesthetic 
approach differs in kind from standard result-oriented modes of in-
quiry and measurement. 
Expression of human potential Viewing the Coase Theorem as a 
story, Mark Kelman reacts aesthetically by asking "what human po-
tentials are unfolded and revealed, which ones are suppressed?"97 
Other scholars also present the aesthetic response as forward-focused 
and concerned with future reality: "a mixture of 'is' and 'ought.' " 98 
Robin West claims that "[t]he aesthetic quality of our art, like the 
90. M. KELMAN, supra note 66, at 61. 
91. Id. at 59. 
92. Louis Schwartz also recognizes the link between group psychology and aesthetic re-
sponse. Although he equates justice with beauty and "fitness of judgment to circumstances,'' he 
allows that a lynch mob cannot do justice to gratify its own conception of what is fitting. Ac-
cording to Schwartz, "[t]hat would be akin to abdicating literary or artistic criticism to the most 
vulgar tastes." Schwartz, supra note 48, at 179. 
93. Cornell, supra note 48, at 380. 
94. Id. (quoting K. Orro-APPEL, The Communication Community and the Foundation of 
Ethics, in TOWARDS A 'TRANSFORMATION OF PHILOSOPHY 225 (G. Adey trans. 1980)). 
95. Schwartz, supra note 48, at 145. 
96. Kelman treats the theorem not as empirically falsifiable or verifiable but as an expression 
of our culture. Kelman, supra note 47, at 1215. 
97. Id. at 1221. 
98. Id. at 1220. 
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quality of our play, deeply affects our lives: our imaginings are not 
only a part of our present, but a way of determining the limits of our 
future."99 In a similar vein, Drucilla Cornell links aesthetic commit-
ment to the reconstruction of our social world and "not only the ca-
pacity for judgment but also the ability to dream of what-is-not-
yet."IOO 
These categories of meaning are not mutually exclusive and the 
terms "aesthetic" and "aesthetics" are richly textured. Some of the 
meanings invoked by legal scholars echo philosophical approaches ex-
amined in the preceding section. Two are particularly important: the 
aesthetic viewpoint as noninstrumental and different in kind from ra-
tional or empirical approaches and aesthetic value as resting on tran-
scendent universal qualities. In the next Part, these meanings, 
augmented by philosophical notions, form the focus of my analysis of 
the role of aesthetic considerations in proced~al reform. 
III. AEsTHETICS AND PROCEDURAL REFORM 
My definition of "aesthetic" here incorporates many of the views 
of the scholars discussed above. A number of their approaches to aes-
thetics, however, have been excluded from my analysis. I suspect, for 
example, that subjective characteristics - among them, taste and per-
sonal psychological-sociological profile - may predispose individuals 
toward certain types of procedures. Io I Yet, philosophy teaches us that 
claims of taste and individual predisposition, while not necessarily in-
valid, present serious problems for the aesthetician. I02 For purposes of 
my analysis, not only are such claims difficult or impossible to prove 
but, even if proved, they may simply describe the human condition 
rather than provide any insights into a more specific link between aes-
thetics and procedural reform. Accordingly, I ignore these factors in 
my analysis. 
Philosophy suggests that other aspects of my argument have more 
secure moorings in aesthetics. I contend that procedural reformers 
sometimes perceive procedure in a noninstrumental manner, as pure 
form rather than applied formula, and that reformers judge proce-
dures partly on the basis of transcendent formal qualities. The notion 
of an aesthetic attitude detached from practical, cognitive and per-
99. West, supra note 47, at 211. 
100. Cornell, supra note 48, at 380. 
101. Mark Kelman sometimes uses "aesthetic" in this sense. See, e.g., supra text accompany-
ing notes 64-68, 84-85, 92. 
102. See supra note 33. 
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sonal concerns is central to aesthetics as a philosophical discipline; 103 
legal scholars have also recognized a distinct aesthetic viewpoint and 
have contrasted it with instrumental modes of perception.104 Simi-
larly, philosophers and legal scholars have acknowledged the existence 
of universal qualities on which aesthetic value is based.1°5 
Admittedly, proving a link between aesthetics and procedural re-
form may be impossible. As Mark Kelman said in a similar context, 
"as with most aesthetic claims, there is little way to prove the connec-
tion other than by laying it out and directly assessing its plausibil-
ity. "106 Proceduralists rarely, if ever, make explicit references to 
aesthetics, nor has aesthetics ever been openly recognized as part of 
the process of procedural reform.107 Mindful of these limitations, I 
focus on identifying aesthetic orientations of procedural reformers 
who advocated procedural codes and those who promoted uniform 
rules of federal procedure; I then consider briefly the role aesthetics 
plays in the work of modem reformers, particularly those who seek 
reforms drawn from comparative procedure. 
A. Code and Federal Rules Reformers 10s 
Simplicity and flexibility were the watchwords of the reformers re-
103. See supra text accompanying notes 23-32. 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 93-96. 
105. Monroe Beardsley's General Canons provide a useful articulation of these qualities. See 
supra text accompanying notes 34-46; see also supra text accompanying notes 86-89. 
106. M. KELMAN, supra note 66, at 59. 
107. Cf. Bone, supra note 16, at 20-21 n.41 (nineteenth-century critics of common law writs 
based their criticism on the "unscientific" nature of the writ system, but in reality they were 
expressing their desire for an ideal form of procedural system); Gordon, supra note 13, at 443 
(codification justified as democratic reform, but it was also used to consolidate the power of the 
elite and to render the law more aesthetically pleasing); T. KUHN, supra note 7, at 155 (in sci-
ence, aesthetic reasons for rejecting an old paradigm are "rarely made entirely explicit"). 
108. Several recent articles provide detailed analyses of the social, political and intellectual 
climate surrounding procedural codification in the late nineteenth century and federal rules 
reform in the early twentieth century. Judith Resnik traces t1Je world view of the drafters of the 
Federal Rules in an effort to discover the influences that animated Rules reform. See Resnik, 
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline. 53 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 494 (1986). Stephen 
Subrin considers social and political factors affecting code and federal rules reformers and places 
both reform efforts in historical perspective. See Subrin, supra note 17. Robert Bone explores 
the normative framework underlying the rhetoric of procedural reform from the Field Code to 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Bone, supra note 16. I am indebted to these authors 
and have often relied on their insights in this article. My own approach to the code and Federal 
Rules reformers is necessarily different; in essence, I seek to illuminate a small corner of the 
territory explored by Professors Resnik, Subrin, and Bone. For purposes of this article, I 
consider portions of the written and spoken works of four reformers in an attempt to discover 
clues to their aesthetic attitudes and values. My aim is therefore not a historical, political, or 
ideological overview but instead a microcosmic, perhaps somewhat eccentric view of one among 
many motivating forces behind procedural change. 
372 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:352 
sponsible for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.109 The 1938 Rules 
were the product of several decades of procedural evolution and de-
bate, much of it focusing on the issue of how simple, symmetrical and 
flexible procedure should be. By 1934, it was clear which direction 
would be taken at the federal level: President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
signing legislation that gave the Supreme Court power to promulgate 
procedural rules for the federal courts, commented: "For the compli-
cated procedure of the past, we now propose to substitute a simplified, 
flexible, scientific, correlated system of procedural rules prescribed by 
the Supreme Court."11° Complexity and technicality were evils to be 
avoided111 and both were linked to the common law. As a result, re-
formers used equity as a guide to shape the new Federal Rules. 112 
Several procedural reformers were particularly influential in the 
process leading up to the 1938 Rules, prominent among them David 
Dudley Field, Roscoe Pound, Thomas Wall Shelton, and Charles E. 
Clark.113 Described as an "inexhaustible one man codifying 
machine,"114 David Dudley Field, a member of the New York Com-
mission on Practice and Pleading, was the architect of the Field Code 
of 1848, adopted in over half the states by the end of the nineteenth 
century.115 Field had no direct involvement in the formulation of the 
Federal Rules; however, the Field Code charted a course followed in 
part by the drafters of the Federal Rules. 116 Roscoe Pound, a law 
school dean and philosopher of law, delivered his well-known address 
on The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of 
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 1-86. For an in-depth account of the Rules drafting process, see Bur-
bank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982). 
110. 3 F. ROOSEVELT, THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES 304 (1938) (statement on sign-
ing the Enabling Act of 1934). 
111. See infra text accompanying notes 168-81. 
112. For a thorough and thoughtful account of the influence of equity on the framing of the 
Federal Rules, see Subrin, supra note 17. See also Bone, supra note 16, at 27-45, 89-103 (discuss-
ing inter a/ia the role of equity in Code and Federal Rules reform). 
113. Both the choice of focusing on these particular reformers and the descriptions herein of 
their personalities and predilections are inspired by, and often drawn directly from, Stephen 
Subrin's excellent article on the history of Federal Rules reform. See Subrin, supra note 17. I am 
grateful to Professor Subrin for the rich materials he has uncovered concerning these reformers 
and the period during which they worked. Whenever possible, I have relied directly on primary 
sources. In this section, those sources are quite often ones to which Professor Subrin's work has 
led me. My debt to him is thus greater than any footnote or footnotes may reflect. 
114. Gordon, supra note 13, at 435. 
115. See C. HEPBURN, supra note 14, at 14-15. 
116. Some maintain that the Federal Rules were a natural outgrowth of the Field Code. See, 
e.g., F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 2.5, at 65-66, § 2.11, at 85-86 (1st ed. 1965); c. WRIGHT, 
THE LAW OF FEDERAL CoURTS 436 (4th ed. 1983). Professor Subrin points out significant 
differences between the approach taken by Field and that taken by the Federal Rules reformers, 
notably Field's distrust of the judiciary and respect for the jury. See Subrin, supra note 171 at 
931-39. 
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Justice 111 to the American Bar Association's annual meeting in 1906. 
His spoken and written commentary in the early part of the twentieth 
century118 sounded many themes which influenced the development of 
the Federal Rules. Thomas Wall Shelton was a Virginia lawyer and 
the first chair of the ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure. 
He enthusiastically lobbied for the Enabling Act, legislation granting 
the Supreme Court rulemaking authority for the federal courts, and he 
was a proponent of the early conservative ideology behind that Act.119 
Charles E. Clark, professor and later Dean at the Yale Law School, 
was Reporter of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee that drafted 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 120 Through his scholarship, 121 
and his role as Reporter, 122 Clark exerted a powerful influence on the 
shape the Rules would take. 
Aesthetic attitude. None of the four procedural reformers under 
scrutiny had an exclusively aesthetic attitude toward procedure. Each 
had in mind a practical goal for procedural rules to accomplish. Yet 
on occasion each viewed procedure in a detached, noninstrumental 
manner, without a commitment to practical goals. Each had his own 
view of procedure for its own sake. 
David Dudley Field loved astronomy and mathematics; his affinity 
for science colored his view of procedure.123 He saw procedural and 
substantive law together as forming "the science of the law," a care-
fully constructed body of rules to prevent the "maladministration of 
117. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 
A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906). This address has been reprinted at 35 F.R.D. 241, 273-91. Citations 
herein are to the latter publication. 
118. See, e.g., Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 CoLUM. L. REV. 20 (1905); Pound, The 
Etiquette of Justice, 3 PROC. NEB. ST. B.A. 231 (1906-1909); Pound, Some Principles of Proce-
dural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388 (1910) [hereinafter Pound, Some Principles]; Pound, supra note 
117. 
119. See Subrin, supra note 17, at 949 (pointing out that conservatives were the initial sup-
porters of the Enabling Act but later liberals "took the Act as their own"). 
120. See Appointment of Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law Rules, 295 
U.S. 774 (1935). 
121. See, e.g., Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REv. 517 (1925); 
Clark, The Union of Law and Equity, 25 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 (1925); Clark & Moore, A New 
Federal Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 44 YALE L.J. 387, 1291 (1935). 
122. See Subrin, supra note 17, at 973 (noting that Clark was committed to equity procedure 
before the Advisory Committee had met and so stated on an early agenda sent to committee 
members). 
123. Professor Subrin quotes from a journal written by Field when he was 28: "[Mathemat-
ics'] superiority over every other department of learning (and superiority I think it has) is to be 
ascribed, I fancy to the precision of its language." Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field 
Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REv. 311, 315 
(1988); see also id. at 328-29 (Field's science-based view of the universe led to his preference for a 
pleading system grounded on "facts constituting a cause of action."). 
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justice" by curbing judicial discretion and caprice.124 Field stated, 
"The law is our oruy sovereign. We have enthroned it."125 For Field, 
procedure could advance law as a scientific enterprise by providing a 
framework for ascertaining "facts" and thus objective reality. The 
Field Code required that a complaint contain "facts constituting the 
cause of action"126 and used the term "cause of action" to describe 
those fact groupings that would trigger judicial intervention.127 Field 
wanted procedure to be orderly and simple, but also definite and im-
pervious to change through exercise of judicial discretion. In this lat-
ter respect, ·he ·differed significantly from the reformers who 
followed. 128 
For Roscoe Pound, procedure was "the mere etiquette of jus-
tice. "129 Nevertheless, he viewed procedural form as important, com-
menting that "form is, if I may say so, the substance of adjective 
law."130 Like Field, Pound wa8 drawn to science and was trained as a 
botanist.131 His ideal procedural system called for a more scientific 
approach: procedure should be "systematic and scientific" so as to 
promote "precision, uniformity and certainty in the judicial applica-
tion of substantive law."132 Despite his emphasis on certainty, Pound 
favored a flexible procedural system that granted judges liberal discre-
tion in fashioning procedures for their courtrooms.133 
Thomas Shelton, who admired Pound, came to share Pound's view 
of procedure.134 Shelton envisioned a procedure separate from, but 
facilitative of, substantive law. He likened procedure to a clean pipe, 
124. D. FIELD, Magnitude and Importance of Legal Science, reprinted in 1 SPEECHES, AR-
GUMENI'S, AND MtscELLANEOUS PAPEltS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 517, 530 (A. Sprague ed. 
1884) (address at the opening of the Law School of the University of Chicago, Sept. 21, 1859) 
[hereinafter FIELD SPEECHES]. 
125. Id. 
126. 1848 N.Y. Laws 379, § 120(2). 
127. NEW YORK CoMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS, FIRST REPORT 141 
(1848) [hereinafter 1848 REPORT], discussed in Subrin, supra note 17, at 935; see also 1 FIELD 
SPEECHES, supra note 124, at 240-41. 
128. See Subrin, supra, note 17, at 934-36. The Federal Rules reformers valued flexibility 
and believed that the liberal use of judicial discretion eliminated the need for technical rules. See 
infra text accompanying notes 180-81; Subrin, supra note 17, at 944-45, 951, 964. 
129. Pound, supra note 117, at 284. 
130. Pound, Some Principles, supra note 118, at 389. 
131. D. WIGDOR, ROSCOE POUND, PHILOSOPHER OF LAW 49-67 (1974). 
132. Pound, Some Principles, supra note 118, at 388. Pound called for "the highest scientific 
standard in the administration of justice.'' Pound, supra note 117, at 278. 
133. See Bone, supra note 16, at 98-100; Subrin, supra note 17, at 946-48. 
134. Shelton had initially favored a formal procedural system which restricted judicial dis-
cretion, finding that the law is "worse than meaningless when left to unfettered individual incli-
nation.'' Shelton, The Relation of Judicial Procedure to Uniformity of Law, 72 CENT. L.J. 114, 
117 (1911). However, from 1910 to 1913, Shelton reversed his position and came to favor simple, 
flexible rules which leave judges free "to administer justice" rather than "to follow technicali-
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an unclogged artery, a clear viaduct, or a bridge.135 Following 
Pound's lead, Shelton formulated a "scientific"136_ procedural ideal 
which incorporated modem notions of efficiency and cut though tech-
nicalities with streamlined, straightforward rules.137 
Charles Clark emphasized the secondary role of procedure: "pr~ 
cedural rules are but means to an end, means to the enforcement of 
substantive justice."138 He saw procedure as "the hand-maid and not 
the mistress of justice''139 and believed that "rules of pleading or prac-
tice should at all times be but an aid to an end and not an end in 
themselves."140 In college, Clark excelled in mathematics.141 Unlike 
Field, however, whose mathematical interest led him to focus on as-
certaining facts through procedural rules, Clark adopted a then-mod-
em view grounded in legal realism: facts cannot be determined 
scientifically and a procedural system that rests on distinctions be-
tween law, facts and evidence is seriously :tlawed.142 Clark's desire to 
strip away procedural technicalities and fomial obstructions reflected 
his modernism. He described the pared-down pleading provisions of 
the Federal Rules as "the best there is in pleading today"143 notwith-
standing his awareness that more case-specific. pleading rules were 
sometimes warranted.144 · · 
ties." Shelton, Hobbled Justice - A Talk with Judges, 13 MINN. L. REv. 129, 129-30 (1929). 
See generally Subrin, supra note 17, at 949-56. 
135. T: SHELTON, SPIRIT OF }HE CoURTS 17, 32, 72 (1918). 
136. Subrin, supra note 17, at 959. 
137. See, e.g., T. SHELTON, supra note 135, at 83-96; Shelton, Campaign for Modernizing 
Procedure, 7 A.B.A. J. 165, 166-67 (1921); Shelton, A New Era of Judicial Relations, 23 CASE & 
CoM. 388, 393 (1916). Frederic Winslow Taylor's ideas about scientific efficiency were attractive 
to both progressives and conservatives during the early twentieth century. Subrin, supra note 17, 
at 959 n.294; see also infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
138. Clark, Fundamental Changes Effected by the New Federal Rules (pt. 1), 15 TENN. L. 
REV. 551, 551 (1939) [hereinafter Clark, Fundamental Changes]; see also Clark, The Challenge of 
a New Federal Civil Procedure, 20 CoRNBLL L.Q. 443, 443 (1935) [hereinafter Clark, The Chal-
lenge] (referring to procedure as "only the process or machinery for getting court work done 
efficiently and effectively"). · 
139. Clark, Fundamental Changes, supra note 138, at 551 (citing In re Coles, [1907] 1 K.B. 
1, 4 (opinion of Collins, M.R.)). 
140. Id. 
141. Subrin, supra note 17, at 962. According to Clark's son, Elias Clark, Clark thought that 
the study of mathematics was the best preparation for law school. Id. pt 962 n.309. 
142. See generally Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 Y ALB L.J. 259 (1926); see also 
Clark, The Proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A. J. 447, 450 (1936) [hereinafter 
Clark, Proposed Rules] (distinction between facts and evidence indefensible); Clark, The New 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase...: Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of 
the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A. J. 976, 977 (1937) [hereinafter Clark, The 
Last Phase] (proof offacts is not the function of pleading); Bone, supra note 16, at 86-87 (discuss-
ing influence of philosophical pragmatism on Clark's views regarding rights and facts). 
143. Clark, The Challenge, supra note 138, at 456. 
144. See infra note 169. 
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For each of these reformers, procedure possessed a disembodied 
quality. Field thought procedure should facilitate the enforcement of 
substantive law,145 a carefully crafted set of rules both simple and or-
derly, part of his "scientific" construct. For Pound, Shelton, and 
Clark, procedure was thoroughly divorced from substance: procedure 
constituted mere rules of etiquette, an unclogged artery through which 
substantive rights could flow, a means to an end.146 These varied vi-
sions were at once instrumental and noninstrumental; instrumental be-
cause procedure had a function to perform but noninstrumental147 
because significance was attached to procedural form. Field thought a 
procedural code should have "[u]nity of design and uniformity of ex-
pression."148 For Pound, form was "the substance of adjective law"l49 
and materialized as a clear viaduct in Shelton's writing.15° Clark, a 
thoroughgoing pragmatist concerning the role of procedure, still in-
sisted that procedural rules be modem, elastic, sleekI51 even when 
pragmatism dictated the need for more detail and complexity.1s2 
Science was invoked by Code and Federal Rules reformers alike. 
Field believed in the "science of the law,''153 Pound desired a "system-
atic and scientific" procedure, 154 Shelton underscored the scientific ba-
sis of the new judicial procedure, 155 and Clark sought to advance the 
science of pleading by freeing pleading from technical requirements.156 
Legal science and scientific efficiency held a powerful attraction during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.157 Common law techni-
145. Professor Bone points out that late nineteenth-century code reformers tended to view 
legal right and legal remedy as fundamentally dichotomous. Procedure was seen as instrumental 
to the proper enforcement of substantive law: "a decision about procedure ought to be made by 
reference to what was necessary to enable the court to craft the remedy that best fit the natural 
structure of rights involved in a dispute." Bone, supra note 16, at 8. See generally id. at 945. 
146. Twentieth-century procedural reformers rejected the rights-remedy dichotomy of the 
late nineteenth-century jurists. They tended to adopt a pragmatic view according to which pro-
cedure was the vehicle for finding the facts of a concrete dispute and identifying substantive 
norms applicable to it. See Bone, supra note 16, at ~0-98. 
147. Of course, simply because an attitude is noninstrumental does not mean it is aesthetic. 
See, e.g., R. CoVER & 0. FlSs, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 2-3 (1979) (describing as nonin-
strumental essays focusing on social and cultural context of procedure). 
148. Reasons/or the Adoption of the Codes by New York, in 1 FIELD SPEECHES, supra note 
124, at 362-63. 
149. Pound, Some Principles, supra note 118, at 389. 
ISO. See supra text accompanying note 135. 
151. See, e.g., Clark, Proposed Rules, supra note 142, at 44849; Clark, The Last Phase, supra 
note 142, at 976-77. 
152. See infra notes 165, 169. 
153. 1 FIELD SPEECHES, supra note 124, at 519; see also Subrin, supra note 123, at 315. 
154. Pound, Some Principles, supra note 118, at 388. 
ISS. See supra text accompanying notes 136-37. 
156. Clark, The Last Phase, supra note 142, at 976. 
157. See, e.g., F. FREIDEL, AMERICA IN THE 'TwENTIETH CENTuRY 36-37 (2d ed. 1965); R. 
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calities were considered "unscientific"; science provided a model for 
achieving certainty and adaptability in the law.15s Science also played 
an aesthetic role: it represented efficiency and modernity, embodying 
many of the qualities which contributed to the reformers' aesthetic 
vision of procedure. Clarity, precision, simplicity, and symmetry were 
each values that science seemed to possess. In fact, during the time of 
the early Federal Rules reform efforts, the scientific world itself had 
been transformed by the relativity theory of Albert Einstein, a scientist 
who considered aesthetics important.159 
Even though they did not agree about all aspects of a procedural 
ideal, to the extent that the Code and Federal Rules reformers appreci-
ated certain stylistic qualities in procedure, their attitudes were aes-
thetic. This does not mean that their perceptions were limited to, or 
by, aesthetic sensibilities; it does suggest that aesthetic considerations 
exerted an influence on reforms. The philosophy of aesthetics de-
scribes how an object can be perceived in a number of ways. Beards-
ley, for example, notes that one may judge an apple for its practical, 
economic value but also may savor its surface qualities of color, tex-
ture and taste.160 These two forms of perception are not mutually ex-
clusive. In more abstract realms, the same principle holds true: one 
may appreciate a mathematical formula for its neatness, elegance, or 
economy without detracting from its usefulness. 
The moment of detachment from the practical and instrumental 
characterizes the aesthetic attitude. Each procedural reformer above 
seems to have had such a moment, when concern over pragmatic out-
comes gave way to appreciation of something more abstract, a system 
whose very shape - simple or elastic or certain or symmetrical -
could be admired. Admittedly, this claim is virtually impossible to 
substantiate; yet, the feeling that aesthetics played an important role in 
the process emerges from the reformer's remarks taken as a whole. 
One senses that a reformer begins by seeking simplicity for pragmatic 
reasons but that at times the search for simplicity takes on a life of its 
own, overriding practical concerns. In these instances, the rhetoric of 
WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920, at 145-57 (1967); Bone, supra note 16, at 24; 
Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York City 
Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LA WYERS IN Posr-C!vIL w AR AMERICA 51-
59 (G. Gawalt ed. 1984); Gordon, supra note 13, at 445-58. 
158. See Bone, supra note 16, at 20 n.41; Gordon, supra note 13, at 445-46. Professor Fried-
man points out that legal educators, led by Langdell, also embraced the scientific model and 
developed methods stressing law's universal and systematic aspects. See Friedman, supra note 
12, at 370.71. 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 2-6. 
160. M. BEARDSLEY, supra note 20, at 62; see supra text accompanying note 26. 
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instrumentalism masks an unconscious striving toward an aestheti-
cally pleasing procedural form. 
Some procedural features suggest a hidden, perhaps subliminal, 
aesthetic agenda. The Field Code, for example, required joinder of 
necessary parties, defined as those persons whose "rights" might suffer 
"prejudice" as a result of "a complete determination of the contro-
versy" between the parties before the court.161 But this "prejudice" 
was not due to res judicata or estoppel: 
[N]onparties were no more bound by the decree in code procedure than 
they had been in equity. Nor was the code primarily concerned about 
the decree's creating actual harm to the absent person or practical im-
pediments to her ability to vindicate her rights in a separate proceeding. 
Rights were "prejudiced" when a court analyzed and determined them, 
even though its determination had no binding effect on the absent 
[party].162 
Why then require joinder of such parties? One commentator ex-
plains the requirement as part of the Code reformers' focus on remedy: 
courts should be able to grant at least a minimally adequate remedy 
without determining the rights of a nonparty. 163 An aesthetic perspec-
tive suggests that the code reformers also required joinder because it 
preserved a more desirable procedural shape. A party was free to 
choose a remedy or remedies and thus to shape party structure.164 
Once this choice was made, however, the Code insisted that the result-
ing structure retain an acceptable level of aesthetic unity. Joinder of 
necessary parties can be explained as a mechanism for eliminating 
clutter and ensuring completeness. 
Hints of aesthetic motivation also exist in the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, although mostly through omission. For example, the 
Rules contain no mechanism for separating cases according to differ-
ing procedural needs despite Clark's own recognition of the desirabil-
ity of such a sorting mechanism.165 Professor Subrin explains the 
161. This provision was contained in the Field Code as amended in 1849. See 1849 N.Y. 
Laws 640, § 122. 
162. Bone, supra note 16, at 68. 
163. Id. at 69-71. 
164. Professor Bone questions the code drafters' decision to give parties freedom to shape 
party structure rather than compelling joinder of all proper parties. He speculates that this form 
of party autonomy may have been intended to reduce the number oflawsuits or, more probably, 
that remedy choice was considered a private matter. Id. at 70 n.219. 
165. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Clark conducted a series of empirical studies concern-
ing state and federal litigation. In a study of civil litigation in the federal courts, Clark observed 
that complex cases involving the government required different procedures than simpler cases 
and that a sorting mechanism would be desirable. See Subrin, supra note 17, at 965-66, 995-96; 
see also AMERICAN LAW INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL CoURTS, PART 
II, CML CASES (1934); Resnik, supra note 108, at 509 (discussing the ALI study). 
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omission: "Such an integration of procedure and substance ... would 
have required a degree of technicality, categorization, and definition 
that was at odds with the simplicity and uniformity themes the propo-
nents had developed to propel their reform."166 An aesthetic perspec-
tive would add that a mechanism for separating simple and complex 
cases would have spoiled the unified shape of the Rules and disturbed 
their aesthetic "focus."167 This aesthetic concern might well have pre-
ceded, at an unconscious level, a reformist platform based on uniform-
ity and simplicity.16s . 
Similarly, the Rules do not contain different pleading requirements 
for different kinds of cases, although the reformers were aware of dif-
ferences among cases that would have made it pragmatically desirable 
to fashion case-sensitive pleading rules. 169 The rejection of case-spe-
cific pleading seems based, at least in part, on a commitment to an 
aesthetically simple pleading system, coherent and complete, stream-
lined and uncluttered. Perhaps unconsciously, the Rules reformers, 
despite their instrumental, pragmatic agenda, took an aesthetic atti-
tude toward procedure and advanced simplicity ofform170 even when 
pragmatism might have suggested a more complicated or more de-
tailed path.171 
166. Subrin, supra note 17, at 995-96. 
167. See infra text accompanying notes 207-12; see also Resnik, supra note 108, at 508-12 
(demonstrating that the private damage action was the principal paradigm case underlying the 
Rules and that the drafters discounted differences among kinds of cases). 
168. In the same way, aesthetic concerns, quite apart from political, social, or other mo-
tivators, may constitute part of an explanation of "trans-substantive" procedural rules. See 
Cover, supra note 17, at 732-33. 
169. See Subrin, supra note 17, at 977. The refusal to countenance a procedural system with 
a variegated pleading mechanism is based largely on a reformist commitment to uniformity and 
simplicity, Clark himself acknowledged the reformer's strategic inability to compr9mise, stating 
that "reformers must follow their dream and leave compromise to others; else they will soon find 
that they have nothing to compromise." Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-
1958: Tho Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 435, 448 (1958) (footnote 
omitted); see also Subrin, supra note 17, at 977 n.393 (providing examples of Clark's reformist 
zeal). 
170. Professor Subrin maintains that Clark "made an art form of procedural formlessness." 
Subrin, supra note 17, at 992. 
171. A number of early critics of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressed fears that 
the framers of the Rules had carried their commitment to simplicity and flexibility beyond the 
point of practicality. A prominent critic, Professor O.L. McCaskill, complained, for example, 
that "[t]he problem of simplifying procedure is more than a problem of elimination. Pleadings 
may be made so simple, in the interest of the pleader and his client, that they cease to serve any 
useful purpose." McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 614, 621 (1934). He 
feared that "flexibility may be carried to such an extreme that our procedural machine will have 
no stability." Id. at 620. For a present-day defense on pragmatic grounds of the principles of 
generalism and flexibility in rulemaking, see Carrington, Making Rules To Dispose of Manifestly 
Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2079-85 (1989). 
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Aesthetic value. It is not surprising that the Code and Federal 
Rules reformers, having sometimes taken an aesthetic attitude toward 
procedure, also sometimes would make aesthetic value judgments 
about procedure. Simplicity stands out as the single most venerated 
aesthetic quality; both the Code and Federal Rules reformers valued 
simplicity as a procedural goal despite divergent views on how to at-
tain it. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to sort out the reformers' aesthetic 
value judgments in a completely clearcut way. Reformers did not la-
bel or identify certain value judgments as aesthetic. As Kuhn points 
out in the scientific context, aesthetic arguments are "rarely made ex-
plicit" - a new theory is simply "said to be 'neater,' 'more suitable,' 
or 'simpler' than the old."172 In addition, value statements can have 
multiple meanings. One can, for example, value procedural simplicity 
not only because it renders enforcement of substantive law more effi-
cient but also because it pleases one's aesthetic sensibilities. Even the 
reformers themselves likely would have been unable to unravel and 
identify each of the coexisting reasons underlying their value judg-
ments. I therefore propose simply to demonstrate how the values ar-
ticulated by the reformers match aesthetic categories.173 
Field and his associates balked at the needless technicalities 
spawned by common law procedure and sought a procedural system 
that would facilitate the simple and inexpensive application of law. 
Thus, pleading was to be "in ordinary and concise language, without 
repetition."174 This reduced the amount of required documentation, 
with all trials to be based on testimony in open court.17s 
For the Rules reformers, simplicity was the centerpiece of the new 
federal procedure.176 Their criticisms of preexisting procedural sys-
tems reflect the reformers' preoccupation with attaining the simplest 
172. T. KUHN, supra note 7, at 155. 
173. For this purpose, I use Monroe Beardsley's formula for identifying statements of aes-
thetic value and apply the principles underlying his Canon of Unity. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 33-46. 
174. 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 521-23, §§ 120(2), 128(2), 131. 
175. See 1848 REPORT, supra note 127, at 177, 244; 1 FIELD SPEECHES, supra note 124, at 
227, 232, 260. 
176. Simplicity had also been a major theme in nineteenth-century procedural reform in Eng· 
land. The Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 consolidated English courts into one Supreme Court 
of Judicature and simplified pleading, in effect abolishing old forms of action. Joinder rules were 
simplified and liberalized in an attempt to eliminate multiplicity of suits. See C. HEPBURN, supra 
note 14, at 182-85 (Judicature Acts), 193-94 (pleading simplification), 202-04 (joinder). The di-
rection taken by the English, particularly their emphasis on simplicity, was seen as worthy of 
emulation by the Federal Rules reformers. See, e.g., T. SHELTON, supra note 134, at 58-62, 256; 
Pound, supra note 117, at 284-86. 
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possible procedure, free of technicality and detail. 177 Pound, for ex-
ample, decried "the lavish granting of new trials"178 and "too much 
detail of procedure" in appellate practice, making it "too elabo-
rate. "179 His ideal "modern practice act" contained only "the general 
principles of practice" - details were left to rules of court.180 In fact, 
in Pound's view, "as between arbitrary action of the law in nearly all 
cases, because of the complexity of procedure, and arbitrary action of 
the judge in some cases, the latter would be preferable."1s1 
Shelton also abhorred procedural complexity. His campaign for 
the Enabling Act had as its ultimate goal "a simple, correlated, scien-
tific system of rules of procedure and practice, in lieu of the present 
complicated so-called 'federal practice.' " 182 Shelton admired the 
straightforward, streamlined practices of business and commerce and 
thought legal procedure should emulate them.1s3 
Clark, too, valued simplicity. This is particularly striking in his 
approach to pleading. Clark criticized common law pleading as "a 
curious mixture of the simple and the complex" and believed that the 
best Code reform preserved "the good points of the older pleading ... 
in the simple and uncomplicated form of allegation and defense."184 
In Clark's view, "the simple provisions for stating the case in the com-
177. Late nineteenth-century critics of the New York Code of Civil Procedure, called the 
Throop Code, presaged the Federal Rules reformers' emphasis on simplicity. The Throop Code 
was long (3441 provisions by 1897) and contained substantive and procedural provisions side by 
side. See Subrin, supra note 17, at 940-41. Critics attacked the Throop Code for being "too 
minute and technical, and lack[ing] elasticity and adaptability." Report of the Committee on 
Code Revision, 22 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. 170, 175 (1899). quoted in Subrin, supra note 17, at 940 
n.183. A further criticism sounded an unmistakably aesthetic chord: the Throop Code was seen 
as flawed because of its "patent lack of arrangement and symmetry." President's Address by J. 
Newton Fiero (Jan. 18, 1893), reprinted in 16 N.Y. ST. B.A. REP. 48, 50 (Jan. 18, 1893), quoted 
in Subrin, supra note 17, at 941 n.188. 
178. Pound, supra note 117, at 288. 
179. 5 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE § 148, at 651 (1959). 
180. Pound, supra note 117, at 287. 
181. Pound, The Etiquette of Justice, supra note 118, at 249. 
182. Shelton, Compoign for Modernizing Procedure, 7 A.B.A. J. 165, 166 (1921); see also 
Subrin, supra note 17, at 958-59 (procedural simplicity argument was voiced by many supporters 
of the Enabling Act). 
183. Shelton, An Efficient Judicial System, address given to Miss. Bar Assn., May 25, 1915, 
reprinted in Simplificatfon of Judicial Procedure: Hearings on S. Res. 522 Before the Subcomm. of 
the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 74-75 (1915). Indeed, Shelton once ex-
pressed his fear that procedural technicalities were "making Bolshevists in this country" by un-
dprmining public respect for the legal system. Procedure in the Federal Courts: Hearings on 
H.R. 2377 and H.R. 90 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1922). 
Shelton admired "[t]he English judge [who] brushes aside senseless technicalities in the same 
spirit he would a house fly." Shelton, The Drama of English Procedure, 17 VA. L. REV. 215, 252 
(1931). 
184. Clark, The Last Phase, supra note 142, at 977. 
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plaint ... represent about the best there is in pleading today."185 He 
favored joining all matters in a single action not only because it would 
save time and money for court and litigants, but also because it would 
simplify and reduce court litigation records.186 The latter goal seems 
at once instrumental - fewer, simpler records may enhance efficiency 
- and noninstrumental - even if more detailed or voluminous 
records are sometimes helpful, streamlining reduces clutter. Joinder 
was, in aesthetic terms, neater, simpler, and more elegant. 
Seeking simplicity in procedure invokes aesthetic unity. Unity is 
the most universally recognized criterion for analyzing aesthetic form 
in works of art. When an art object is unified, it is "simple" in the 
sense that it is of one piece and contains nothing superfluous.181 In 
science, too, the search for simplicity is an appeal to the aesthetic 
value of unity: nowhere is this more apparent than in Einstein's drive 
to generalize, and thereby to unify, apparently divergent fields of 
physics.188 
Recall that unity has two components: completeness (an object's 
needing nothing outside itself) and coherence (how the parts of an ob-
ject fit together).189 Coherence in turn may be based on at least three 
principles: focus (the dominant pattern or compositional scheme), bal-
ance or equilibrium (the connection between parts of a whole), and 
harmony (similarities among parts of a design). A close examination 
of the reformers' quest for simplicity demonstrates that completeness 
and coherence were central to the reformers' vision of a simple, unified 
procedural system. 
Completeness is an attractive feature of procedure because, in the 
words of one reformer, "it represents the difference between a single 
and permanent surgical operation as compared to chronic physick-
ing."190 For Fie~d, a desire for procedural completeness was part of a 
vision of a procedural code accompanied by a coordinated substantive 
code.191 For the Federal Rules reformers, the same desire led to an 
essentially self-completing Code - general and elastic principles al-
lowed the judiciary to fill in any missing details.192 The drive for com-
185. Clark, The Challenge, supra note 138, at 456. 
186. Clark, The Last Phase, supra note 142, at 977. 
187. See Hospers, supra note 21, at 43. 
188. See G. HOLTON, supra note 2, at 86-87. 
189. These definitions are based on Monroe Beardsley's categorization of statement of aes-
thetic value. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38. 
190. Clark, The Last Phase, supra note 142, at 977. 
191. C. CooK, THE AMERICAN CoDIFICATlON MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM 
LEGAL REFORM 194-96 (1981). 
192. See, e.g., Clark & Moore, supra note 121, at 1323; Pound, supra note 117, at 413. 
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pleteness led Dean Wigmore to complain that the drafters of the 
Federal Rules had failed to place all existing federal practice rules into 
a single compilation, observing that "[t]his Code will fail in an impor-
tant purpose if it does not seek to be complete in itself."193 Wigmore's 
complaint seems motivated at least as much by an aesthetic concern 
for the shape the Rules would take as by a desire for efficiency. 
The reformers also valued completeness in another sense: they 
sought a system that would provide a complete mechanism for resolv-
ing disputes. Having decided that law and equity should be merged, 
both Field and the Rules reformers were drawn to equity practices 
which permitted complete resolution of a controversy without regard 
to substantive law, the number of parties, or the nature and number of 
issues. The Field Code abandoned the technicalities of the writ system 
and allowed parties to plead simply and in ordinary language. Parties 
could amend their pleadings and were permitted to join multiple par-
ties, causes of action, and defenses in a single suit, thus maximizing the 
chance of complete resolution of a controversy.194 The Federal Rules 
reformers carried the completeness ideal even further. Opportunities 
for joinder of parties and claims were increased, 195 amendment of 
193. Wigmore, A Critique of the Federal COurt Rules Draft - Three Larger Aspects of the 
Work Which Require Further Consideration, 22 A.B.A. J. 811, 812 (1936). 
194. See 1848 N.Y. Laws 379, §§ 62 (elimination of forms of action); 97-98 (joinder of par-
ties); 120(2), 128(2), 131 (simple pleading); 129 (joinder of defenses); 143 (joinder of causes of 
action). Professor Bone has noted• a similar drive toward completeness in the work of John 
Norton Pomeroy, a prominent procedure and equity scholar of the late nineteenth century. 
Pomeroy advocated the expansion of equitable "multiplicity-of-suits" jurisdiction, which allowed 
consolidated treatment of numerous, otherwise separate, legal actions. See Bone, supra note 16, 
at 29-39. Pomeroy justified the use of equity jurisdicpon in certain types of cases "not only 
because of the availability of injunctive or other equitable forms of relief, but also, and more 
importantly, because of the power of equity courts to consolidate all the separate law actions and 
render a decree ideally suited to the dispute as a whole." Id. at 34 (citation omitted). In his 
analysis of Pomeroy's work, Professor Bone provides powerful evidence that Pomeroy viewed 
equity procedure aesthetically, in that he was interested more in form than in practical conse-
quences. Pomeroy also sought the aesthetic qualities of elegance and simplicity in an ideal proce-
dural system. With respect to Pomeroy's justification of equity jurisdiction, Professor Bone 
notes: 
Although Pomeroy focused on remedy, he did not take a pragmatic approach to evaluat-
ing remedial quality. He assessed the quality of the remedy by reference to its formal struc-
ture, not its practical consequences .••• In other words, equity jurisdiction was desirable 
whenever joining together all the separate law pieces made it possible to reduce the union of 
partial legal remedies to a more elegant and simpler unitacy form, one that perfectly fit the 
ideal legal structure of the whole dispute. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
195. See, e.g., F'Eo. R. Civ. P. 18, 19, 23 (dealing with joinder of claims, joinder of parties, 
and class actions, respectively). Clark extolled the virtues of the new rules: 
The rules providing for the abrogation of technical forms, ·and for free amendment, the 
simple provisions for stating the case in the complaint, the abolition of demurrers and pleas, 
the explicit provisions as to the answer, with provisions for the filing of as many defenses in 
the alternative or regardless of consistency as the defendant has - all these and the other 
accompanying rules represent about the best there is in pleading today. 
Clark, The Challenge, supra note 138, at 456. 
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pleadings was liberalized, 196 and broad discovery was made central to 
a new notice pleading system.197 These reforms were pragmatic, to be 
sure, but they were also aesthetic, making procedure neater, more 
streamlined, and more elegant. 
The reformers sought unity in a procedural system not only 
through completeness but also through coherence. Pound's view that 
"form is ... the substance of adjective law"198 may be ascribed to each 
of the reformers under scrutiny, for each visualized a set of procedural 
rules that had a certain shape and design. 
A reformer's concept of the focus, pattern or compositional struc-
ture of a set of procedural rules can reflect a desire for coherence. The 
dominant compositional scheme or focus of the Field Code may well 
be its attention to detail and definition, l99 a structure reflecting Field's 
view that procedural rules should be tailored to fashion remedies to 
protect substantive rights. 200 He visualized and constructed a set of 
rules based on careful definitions: for Field, overly flexible rules were 
no rules at all.201 Field could not abide expansive, general code provi-
sions for a number of reasons, among them an aversion to disorder 
and confusion.202 His aesthetic sense of what a properly formulated 
procedural system should look like resulted in a code that was simple 
and elegant, not in some minimalist sense, but due to its circum-
scribed, constrained quality. "Unity of design and uniformity of ex-
pression" were important to Field,203 and both are reflected in the 
structure of his code. 
Field also pursued balance and harmony - other aspects of coher-
ence - when he sought to harmonize procedural forms through the 
merger of law and equity. Separate courts for law and equity, each 
with its own procedures, seemed wasteful, disorderly, and confus-
196. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(f), 15 (dealing with amendment of counterclaims and 
amendment of pleadings, respectively). 
197. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37. 
198. Pound, Some Principles, supra note 118, at 389. It should be noted that coherence does 
not require simplicity; a complex work that is well structured may be coherent. However, the 
Code and Federal Rules reformers seemed to seek coherence through simplification and 
simplicity. 
199. The Field Code was criticized as narrow and formalistic because of its detailed nature. 
See, e.g., c. Cl.ARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CoDE PLEADING 34 (1928); Pound, Some 
Principles, supra note 118, at 403. 
200. For a discussion of the right-remedy-procedure hierarchy that characterized nineteenth-
century procedural thinking, see Bone, supra note 16, at 9-18. 
201. See 1 FIELD SPEECHES, supra note 124, at 330-31, 349, 354; Field, Mr. Field on the 
Codes, 7 ALB. L.J. 193, 196 (1873). 
202. See Subrin, supra note 17, at 934-35 & n.141. 
203. 1 FIELD SPEECHES, supra note 124, at 363. 
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ing. 204 A single set of procedural rules could bring order and predict-
ability to the enforcement of substantive rights.205 The procedural 
choices that Field and the other reformers made in drafting a single 
code for the merged system reflect a desire to balance legal and equita-
ble procedures. Equity practice influenced the Field Code's pleading 
provisions, which eliminated the common law's search for a single is-
sue, and its expansion of a litigant's ability to add parties and issues to 
a single suit. 206 
The Federal Rules reformers also valued coherence. They envi-
sioned a lean and general procedure: Pound favored a "systematic and 
scientific" procedure based on general principles, 201 Shelton wrote of 
the need to simplify procedure,208 and Clark praised simple and un-
complicated procedural forms, particularly in pleading.209 Edgar Tol-
man, secretary of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee for which 
Clark served as Reporter, captured the prevailing sentiment when he 
advised that an ideal set of procedural rules should avoid "the faults of 
our rigid, modem statutes, the best of which contain hundreds of sec-
tions, and the worst of which contain thousands of sections dealing 
with hundreds of thousands of details."210 Instead, Tolman urged, 
drafters of procedural rules should "[e]liminate every requirement ex-
cept the irreducible minimum absolutely necessary to point out the 
plain and straight path from the institution of a suit to the final judg-
ment."211 Along the same lines, Dean Wigmore criticized a prelimi-
nary draft of the Federal Rules for failing to separate lengthy 
paragraphs and number them.212 
The Rules reformers sought coherence as well in a single proce-
dure for cases formerly relegated to either law or equity. Like Field, 
204. See 1848 REPORT, supra note 127, at 73-75; see also 1 FIELD SPEECHES, supra note 124, 
at 236-37 (criticizing the common law for obscuring facts and legal issues). 
205. Some nineteenth-century jurists viewed the elimination of the distinction between law 
and equity and the abolition of forms of action as part of the evolution of the law from a priini-
tive to a more civilized form. Under a merged system, judges could fashion remedies to vindicate 
ideal substantive rights. See Bone, supra note 16, at 18-26. 
206. See 1848 N.Y. Laws 379, §§ 62 (elimination of separate forms of action); 120(2), 128(2), 
131 (pleading provisions); 97-98, 129, 143 Goinder provisions). The Field Code did not always 
adopt equity practice in toto; for example, it required that the pleader use "concise language, 
without repetition," in contrast to equity's toleration of rambling, repetitive pleading. 1848 N.Y. 
Laws 497, § 120(2); see also Bone, supra note 16, at 26 n.62. 
207. Pound, Some Principles, supra note 118, at 388. 
208. See Shelton, Uniform Judicial Procedure Will Follow Simplification of Federal Proce-
dure, 76 CENT. L.J. 207 (1913). 
209. See, e.g., Clark, The Last Phase, supra note 142, at 977. 
210. Tolman, Historical Beginnings of Procedural Reform Movement in This Country-Prin-
ciples to Be Observed in Making Rules, 22 A.B.A. J. 783, 786 (1936). 
211. Id. 
212. Wigmore, supra note 193, at 812. 
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Pound complained about "the obsolete Chinese wall between law and 
equity."213 Clark also took up the banner for merger, stating that "as 
soon as you get away from the history of the struggle between the 
Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice in England, I see no possible 
justification for a division between law and equity."214 In fashioning 
the merged system's procedure, the drafters of the Rules did not seek 
to combine and harmonize elements of both law and equity procedure, 
as Field had done in his code. ·Rather, the Rules reformers favored 
equity as a harmonizing mechanism. The Federal Equity Rules of 
1912 were seen as "the substantial model for the new Federal proce-
dure of the future."21s The equity rules were admired, in a somewhat 
detached manner suggestive of aesthetic appreciation, as the embodi-
ment of "the best of modem reform procedure."216 
The pervasive attraction of simplicity for the Code and Federal 
Rules reformers resulted in procedural systems that emphasized, in 
varying ways, completeness and coherence. Simpler was always bet-
ter; the reasons why were often not articulated.217 Of course, the re-
formers did not always mean the same thing by "simple." Field, for 
example, sought to simplify procedure through his code and yet, sev-
eral decades later, Clark criticized the Field Code for lacking the flexi-
bility he thought a simple procedural system should possess.218 
Simplification was not a code word for a designated set of reforms but 
a more general aesthetic goal. Simplicity came to be desirable for its 
own sake. 
· B. Modem Reformers 
Just as the Federal Rules reformers, bent on simplifying procedure, 
criticized earlier simplification efforts such as the Field Code,219 so 
today some critics find modem procedure too complicated and seek 
213. Pound, supra note 117, at 287. 
214. Clark, Fundamental Changes, supra note 138, at 560. 
215. Clark & Moore, supra note 121, at 435. 
216. Id. at 394. Clark and Moore further noted that, by extending the scope and applicabil-
ity of the equity rules, "the necessary major element" of their reform effort would be "secured." 
Id. 
217. Aesthetics is only one reason among many for the attraction of simplicity. The code 
and Federal Rules reformers believed that simple rules were desirable because they were efficient 
and scientific. See supra text accompanying notes 122-41. In addition, rules deemed "simple" 
because of their open-ended and general nature confer power on the coterie of experts who draft 
them. Such rules need interpretation and it is the drafters, both as consultants and as future 
members of the bench, who are likely to be called upon to provide such interpretation. See supra 
note 13; Subrin, supra note 17, at 968-69. 
218. See C. Cl.ARK, supra note 199, at 34-35. 
219. See supra text accompanying notes 177-86. 
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yet simpler solutions. These critics always have procedural alterna-
tives in mind which would "work" better: their agendas are practical 
and goal-oriented. Often, critics draw suggested alternatives from 
comparative studies of procedure, from a system or systems seemingly 
less mired in the complexity characteristic of American procedure. 
Sometimes, the alternatives they propose take the form of less formal-
istic methods for processing or resolving disputes. Lewis Solomon and 
William Richards, for example, analyze Kpelle (Liberian), Cuban, and 
Chinese methods of conflict resolution and use their analysis as the 
basis of proposals for procedural change. 220 Simplification is first on 
their list of recommendations. Simplification and clarification could, 
they argue, permit individuals to proceed to conflict resolution with-
out lawyers or, even if lawyers were still necessary, would help those 
attorneys "who are often confused by complex court procedures."221 
Many others also place simplification at the center of their reform 
agendas. In the section that follows, I consider a number of reformers 
whose platforms rest, at least in part, on comparisons with the proce-
dural systems of other countries. The reformers do not necessarily 
share a common goal or ideology. For example, Warren Burger meas-
ures current procedures against the standards set in 1906 by Roscoe 
Pound. Derek Bok, on the other hand, takes a broader view, assessing 
the role of law in an increasingly complicated America. John 
Langbein and Albert Alschuler, both admirers of German procedure, 
draw somewhat different conclusions about how that procedure 
should influence our own. What unites these reformers, and the rea-
son I have singled them out, is their attraction to simplicity and sim-
plification: for them, it seems, simpler procedures are at once more 
effective and more aesthetically pleasing. 
1. The Japanese Model 
In 1976, at a conference commemorating Roscoe Pound's 1906 ad-
dress to the American Bar Association, 222 several participants saw 
simplification as central to procedural reform.223 Simon Rifkind, for 
220. Solomon & Richards, Towards a New Mode of Conflict Resolution in Civil Matters, 21 
DB PAULL. R.E.v. 1 (1977). 
221. Id. at 14. 
222. The conference was designated the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dis-
satisfaction with the Administration of Justice, after the title of Pound's address. See Pound, 
supra note 117. The conference proceedings are reported at 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976). 
223. Of course, not all the Pound conferees sought, or even mentioned, simplification. In 
fact, a few participants seemed, if not suspicious, at least cautious about oversimplifying trial 
procedure in an attempt to make it more orderly. Judge Leon Higginbotham, for example, 
warned that "order is not an absolute" and that reforms which threaten to diminish human 
rights, even if promoting greater procedural efficiency, should be scrutinized critically. See Hig-
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example, urged reform "in the direction of simplification of the law" 
not only as a way of easing the burden on the courts but also as a 
mechanism for rendering the law more certain and ptedictable.224 
Others criticized the courts for not taking sufficient steps to simplify 
procedures. 225 Much attention was devoted to alternate streamlined 
methods for processing and resolving disputes, from the institution of 
simpler, more "mechanical" rules which would allow clerks or other 
nonjudicial personnel to resolve disputes, 226 to adopting the British 
practice of handling corporate takeover disputes, 227 to the use of 
ombudsmen and arbitration. 22s 
Prominent among the participants at the 1976 Pound Conference 
was then-Chief Justice Warren Burger, an outspoken critic of modem 
trial practice who has encouraged a variety of reforms aimed at in-
creasing procedural efficiency. In an address to the conference, he 
praised the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as "a major step toward a 
pervasive simplification of procedure" and allowed that "major ad-
vances" had been made since Roscoe Pound's time to simplify both 
trial and appellate procedure.229 Nevertheless, Justice Burger la-
mented the misuse and overuse of pretrial procedures, and called for 
reform in this area. He also urged consideration of new, simpler con-
cepts for the resolution of minor disputes and noted with approval the 
Japanese tradition of informal, private dispute processing as an alter-
native to litigation in some cases.230 Pointing out that Japan has fewer 
lawyers per capita than the United States, Burger attributed the rela-
tive absence of formal litigation in Japan to its history of resolving 
disputes informally "without lawyers, judges and the attendant ex-
pense and delays."231 
Another advocate of simplification is Derek Bok, President of 
Harvard University. In his 1981-1982 report to Harvard's Board of 
ginbotham, The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, 10 F.R.D. 79, 154 (1976). Another 
conference participant, Professor Frank Sander, explored a variety of alternatives to litigation 
but never suggested that any alternative was superior to adjudication because simpler. See 
Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing. 10 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976). 
224. See Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 79, 110 (1976). 
225. See Levi, The Business of Courts: A Summary and a Sense of Perspective, 10 F.R.D. 79, 
215 (1976) (summarizing the views of conference participants). 
226. See id. at 217-18. 
227. See id. at 218. 
228. See Sander, supra note 223. 
229. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. -A Need fer Systematic Anticipation, 10 F.R.D. 79, 95 
(1976). 
230. Id. at 93-96. 
231. Id. at 94. 
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Overseers, 232 Bok was preoccupied with the complexity of American 
life, particularly when it involves matters legal. He commented on the 
"complexity" oflitigation,233 the "elaborateness" of American laws,234 
and the "complexity" and intricacy of American procedures.235 Bok's 
reform agenda centers on simplifying rules and procedures in tandem 
with greater access for the poor and middle class to the legal sys-
tem. 236 Like Justice Burger, Bok is intrigued by comparisons with Ja-
pan: the United States has 35,000 lawyers graduating per year 
compared with under 15,000 total for Japan, he notes, while Japan 
graduates thirty percent more engineers than the United States.237 
The attraction of both Burger and Bok to Japanese procedure is 
puzzling when one considers the reality of Japan's legal culture. In 
Japan, there are, in fact, many fewer lawyers per members of the pop-
ulation at large than in the United States, but this is a function of 
deliberate governmental design rather than the result of a simpler, 
more pristine society. Although approximately 30,000 law graduates 
take the Japanese equivalent of the bar exam each year, less than 500, 
or about two percent, of all applicants pass. 238 The truth is that the 
per capita number of those who take the bar exam is higher in Japan 
than in the United States,239 suggesting a picture quite different from 
Bok's implied image of a population drawn by virtue of superior sensi-
bilities to the more productive field of engineering. 
The nonlitigiousness of the Japanese is also largely a myth. The 
governmentally imposed lawyer shortage, crowded dockets, notori-
ously slow case progress, and procedural hurdles to effective Iaw-
suits240 all make litigation in Japan a daunting enterprise. This does 
232. See Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAG., May-June 1983, at 38. This report was ex-
cerpted and published as Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL 
Eouc. 570 (1983). Citations herein are to the latter publication. 
233. Bok, supra note 232, at 571. 
234. Id. at 574. 
235. Id. at 574-75. Bok also observes that "[t]he roots of our predicament .•• are more 
complex than popular impressions would allow." Id. at 575. 
236. Bok proposes the following: "An effective program will require not only multiple efforts 
but a mixture that involves attempts to simplify rules and procedures as well as measures that 
give greater access to the poor and middle class. Access without simplification will be wasteful 
and expensive; simplification without access will be unjust." Id. at 579. 
237. Id. at 573-74. 
238. Haley, Luck, Law, Culture and Trade: The Intractability of United States-Japan Trade 
Conflict, 22 CoRNELL INTI.. LJ. 403, 421 (1989). See generally Rabinowitz, The Historical De-
velopment of the Japanese Bar, 70 HARV. L. R.Ev. 61 (1956). 
239. See Ramseyer, Japan's Myth of Non-Litigiousness, Natl. L.J., July 4, 1983, at 36, col. 1; 
see also Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and 
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 3 UCLA L. R.Ev. 4, 57-
59 (1983) (small number of lawyers in Japan reflects lack of professional opportunities). 
240. Ramseyer, supra note 239, at 36, cols. 1-3; see also Zaloom, Dispute Resolution in Japan. 
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not mean that the Japanese by nature shun litigation nor that Ameri-
can-style lawsuits do not provide an attractive alternative to Japanese 
dispute resolution in many cases.241 In fact, in cases where foreign, 
rather than Japanese, courts are an available forum, Japanese plaintiffs 
have demonstrated a greater than usual willingness to sue. 242 
The question, then, is why Burger and Bok insist on a mythical 
version of a Japan where life is simpler and saner and legal procedures 
less complicated. The answer rests in part on instrumental bases: the 
system may be more effective, for example, in resolving minor dis-
putes. But another part of the answer may lie in reformist zeal. The 
aesthetic goal of simplicity, of elegance in the design of a procedural 
system, is an attractive foundation on which to build a reform pro-
gram. Such an aesthetic vision, even if a myth, is preferable to the task 
of sorting out the reality of another living, breathing, complex human 
society. Like earlier procedural reformers who often used simplifica-
tion to justify their reform agenda, 243 these modem reformers rely on 
the lure of simplicity to enhance the changes they propose. 
2. The German Model 
Professor John Langbein looks to West Germany as a model for 
reforming American civil and criminal procedure. Time and again, 
Langbein has contrasted the simplicity, elegance, and efficiency of 
German procedure with the complexity, cumbersomeness, and ineffi-
ciency of procedure in the United States.244 > In criminal cases, 
Langbein identifies the complexity of full-scale jury trial as the reason 
for pervasive plea bargaining in the United States; German trial proce-
L.A. Daily J., Sept. 9, 1983 at § 3, col. 1. CJ Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal 
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 311 (1984) (discussing difficulties in making cross-
cultural comparisons of efficiency). 
241. A more telling focus than dispute resolution might be rights vindication; that is, govern-
ment controls on lawyers, courts, and procedures may reduce or simplify litigation but leave 
Japanese citizens without effective means to secure and enforce rights. See Ramseyer, supra note 
239, at 36, col. 3. 
242. See, e.g., Japanese Aversion to Filing Lawsuits is Declining, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Aug. 29, 
1985, at 18, col. 4 (discussing lawsuits in U.S. courts by families of Japanese victims in Korean 
Airlines case). See also Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, in LA w AND THE LEGAL 
PROCESS IN JAPAN 719-33 (D. Henderson & J. Haley eds. 1978) (arguing that prevailing notions 
about the reluctance of the Japanese to litigate are inaccurate); Galanter, supra note 239, at 31-32 
(describing the moral intensity of group litigation in Japan). 
243. See supra note 169. 
244. See, e.g., Langbein, Trashing "The German Advantage," 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 763 
(1988); Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985) 
[hereinafter Langbein, The German Advantage]; Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How 
the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REv. 204 (1979) [hereinafter Langbein, Plea Bargaining]; see 
also Langbein, Comparative Civil Procedure and the Style of Complex Contracts, 35 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 381, 386 (1987) (criticizing inefficiency of American procedure). 
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dure, by contrast, "has been kept uncomplicated and rapid"245 so that 
every case of imprisonable crime can be tried, making plea bargaining 
unnecessary.246 
In civil cases, Langbein characterizes American procedure as ex-
pensive, protracted and unpredictable and contrasts the "tone" of 
German and American civil proceedings: 
Countless novels, movies, plays, and broadcast serials attest to the dra-
matic potential of the Anglo-American trial. The contest between op-
posing counsel; the potential for surprise witnesses who cannot be 
rebutted in time; the tricks of adversary examination and cross-examina-
tion; the concentration of proof-taking and verdict into a single, continu-
ous proceeding; the unpredictability of juries and the mysterious opacity 
of their conclusory verdicts - these attributes of the Anglo-American 
trial make for good theatre. German civil proceedings have the tone not 
of the theatre, but of a routine business meeting - serious rather than 
tense. When the court inquires and directs, it sets no stage for advocates 
to perform. The forensic skills of counsel can wrest no material advan-
tage, and the appearance of a surprise witness would simply lead to the 
scheduling of a further hearing. In a system that cannot distinguish be-
tween dress rehearsal and opening night, there is scant occasion for stage 
fright.247 
Langbein finds the separation of pretrial and trial proceedings in 
American procedure particularly irksome, since it requires that parties 
conduct discovery for the entire case;248 it also compels witnesses to 
tell their stories at least twice and allows for adversary distortions of 
the stories witnesses tell. 249 He proffers the German system as a pref-
erable alternative because it is simpler, neater and more streamlined: 
the judge alone "digs for facts" and controls their presentation over a 
series of hearings rather than in a single, continuous trial. 250 
Albert Alschuler also draws on West German procedure to fashion 
procedural reforms, but not in the same way as Langbein. Like 
Langbein, Alschuler abhors the complexity of American trial proce-
dures - he refers to them as "the world's most extensive collection of 
245. See Langbein, Plea Bargaining, supra note 244, at 206. 
246. Id. at 209. 
247. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 244, at 831. Langbein's use of this theat-
rical metaphor is interesting from an aesthetic point of view, not because it draws its metaphori-
cal material from the arts, but because it suggests a more detached view of procedure and its 
impact. The appreciation of procedural "tone" is at least one step removed from a practical 
instrumental approach to procedure. However, Langbein continues in a much more practical 
vein as he elaborates on his thesis. 
248. Id. at 831. 
249. Id. at 833-34. 
250. Id. at 826-32. 
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cumbersome procedures"251 and advocates a simplified form of adjudi-
cation. 252 Alschuler finds the American jury trial especially distres-
sing as a source of complex procedures designed to make the jury 
system effective.253 He has devised an alternative system, unlike 
Langbein drawing only in part from the German model, designed to 
simplify adjudication while avoiding the dangers of extensive judicial 
oversight.254 The proposed simplified system has two tiers: "first in-
stance" trials following limited discovery, with the judge, not the law-
yers, examining witnesses and controlling the order of proof; and 
"second instance" trials, using procedures in effect at present, for par-
ties dissatisfied with the results of the first-instance trial.255 Cost-shift-
ing offer of settlement rules would operate at both first-instance and 
second-instance proceedings. 256 
Some commentators take issue with Langbein's portrayal of the 
German system;257 a few of their criticisms apply tangentially to Al-
schuler's portrayal as well.258 One critic suggests that Langbein ideal-
izes German procedure and compares it to a caricature of American 
procedure.259 It is true that Langbein presents a somewhat stylized 
view of German procedure; his preoccupation with its shape and tone 
suggest an underlying aesthetic attitude toward the system and its vir-
tues. To the extent that Alschuler embraces Langbein's description of 
the German system, his approach too is partly aesthetic. Yet, 
Langbein has described the German system as he sees it. If the Ger-
many he pictures is idealized, one explanation is that he is building a 
reform platform on the German model. Like others before him, he is 
251. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the 
Need fora Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 IIARv. L. REV. 1808, 1858-59 (1986). 
252. Id. at 1845-54. 
253. Id. at 1824; see also Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: 
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 991-93, 999-1002, 1016-20 
(1983) (describing features of the American jury system). Alschuler also fears that the current 
emphasis on "managerial judging'' to alleviate procedural complexity may sometimes encourage 
"hasty judgment, ••• failure to afford an adequate opportunity to be heard, ••• partiality at trial, 
and ••• undue pressure to settle •••• " Alschuler, supra note 251, at 1836. 
254. Alschuler, supra note 251, at 1840-50. 
255. Id. at 1845-51. 
256. Id. at 1852. 
251. See Allen, Kook, Riechenberg & Rosen, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A 
Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 705 
(1988). 
258. Although Alschuler does not embrace Langbein's vision uncritically, see, e.g., Al-
schuler, supra note 251, at 1842-45, he does accept without question Langbein's view regarding 
the superior efficiency of the German practice of serial evidentiary hearings rather than separate 
pretrial and trial proceedings. Id. at 1841. 
259. Allen, Idealization and Coricature in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 785 
(1988). 
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searching for a way out of the intricate web of American procedure 
and seeking refuge in an almost abstract version of a simpler, more 
efficient German system - a system with "the tone not of the theatre, 
but of a routine business meeting."260 No wonder that the aestheti-
cally pleasing features of the German system - order, control, and 
neatness - are paramount in Langbein's work: he has a reform func-
tion to fulfill and admission of the complexity and disorder that attend 
human enterprise might be taken as weakness. 
CONCLUSION 
Like their forebears, modem reformers do not treat simplicity as 
an exclusively aesthetic goal, nor do they mean the same thing by 
"simple."261 Yet the pervasiveness of references to simplicity, and the 
at least occasional discrepancy between modem procedural visions 
and reality, suggest that these reformers sometimes tend toward sim-
plicity and simplification because they find it more aesthetically pleas-
ing; in turn, this feeling of "rightness" inspires them to adhere 
tenaciously to their reform proposals.262 To say that any of the re-
formers has taken an aesthetic attitude toward procedure is admittedly 
speculative; their articulated goals are pragmatic and their statements 
carefully constructed. The attitudinal hints that one can find in the 
writings and speeches of, for example, the Federal Rules reformers are 
generally absent here.263 It is remarkable, however, how often sim-
plicity appears as a common thread linking otherwise unrelated re-
form agendas: that simpler is better is taken, more or less, as an item 
of faith. The power of this idea is demonstrated in a recent article, in 
which a writer who develops a set of rather complex jurisdictional 
principles to guide the choice of process in a given dispute feels com-
pelled to justify his reform as "simple": "[T]he complexity of the ap-
260. Langbein, The German Advantage, supra note 244, at 831. 
261. See supra text accompanying note 218. 
262. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 8-10 (in science, aesthetic considerations increase 
tenacity of supporters of new paradigm). 
263. But see supra note 247 (Langbein's theatrical metaphor may suggest aesthetic attitude). 
For a striking example of an aesthetic attitude toward procedure, see M. DA.MASKA, THE FACES 
OP JUS'I'ICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986). Professor Da:maSka is not a reformer but a compar-
ative law scholar. In this book, he searches for a typology for comparing adversarial and inquisi-
torial systems and develops an approach detached from "contingencies of history." Id. at 5. 
Using many analogies from science and art, Dama5ka chooses to construct "pure styles" of pro-
cedure rather than to examine individual systems. His rationale has the detachment characteris-
tic of an aesthetic attitude: "one must realize that explorations of individuality become possible 
only after one has first obtained conceptual instruments with which to see and discuss individual-
ity in terms of generic notions.'' Id. at 242; see also Markovits, Playing the Opposites Game: On 
Mirjan Damas1w's THE FACES OP JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (Book Review), 41 STAN. L. 
REV. 1313 (1989) (praising Dama5ka's analysis for the aesthetic pleasure it imparts but criticiz-
ing its failure to capture some of the complex functions of procedural systems). 
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proach here," he argues, "derives from its simplicity."264 
The lure of simplicity, in the guise of simplification, is understand-
able. Where central concerns are overcrowded dockets, delays, and 
inefficiency, it is tempting to seek solutions which shed details and 
neaten up procedural pathways, which sweep clean and eliminate clut-
ter. To be sure, simplicity may lead to more rational procedures, but 
not inevitably. Simplicity is much more likely to lead to aesthetically 
pleasing procedural rules. Unlike a work of art, however, procedure is 
not meant to be placed on a shelf and admired. And, unlike science, 
procedure Qike law in general) does not describe or manipulate the 
inherently orderly natural universe that inspired Einstein. Instead, 
procedure attempts to shape a complex and disorderly world of 
human interactions. It should not be entirely surprising that proce-
dures made simple through minimal structure and definition may be 
unable, by themselves, to bring order to the transactions they govern. 
The very simplicity that gives a procedure its aesthetic value in the 
abstract can contribute to its downfall in concrete application. Dis-
covery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, was 
part of the Federal Rules reformers' larger simplification efforts. 
"Wide open" discovery, it was argued, could help eliminate proce-
dural gamesmanship and put to rout the "sporting theory of justice" 
denounced by Roscoe Pound. 265 Simpler was better: the discovery 
rules are largely open textured and general, meant to provide just 
enough structure to allow an enlightened bench and bar to fill in gaps 
as needed. Today, however, discovery abuse, whether or not of the 
dimensions sometimes claimed,266 is notorious and the source of many 
of the complicated procedural tangles which vex modem jurists. Per-
haps a less simple, more detailed rules scheme - setting limits, speci-
fying discovery orders, imposing nondiscretionary sanctions - would 
be preferable. Simplicity cannot always be relied upon to get the job 
done.267 
264. Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Prin-
ciples For Process Choice, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 893, 1025. 
265. Pound, supra note 117, at 281. 
266. See, e.g., Judges Give Delay Causes: Discovery Abuse Tops List, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1988, 
at 29. But see Trubeck, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 
31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 89-90 (1983) (empirical study revealed relatively little discovery in ordi-
nary lawsuits); see also Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2243-44 (1989) ("Liberal discovery is a 
product of the citizen-consumer orientation of public policy in the last fifty years, not the mis-
guided predilections of the committee that drafted the Federal Rules."). 
267. In the case of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, the original framers' goal of simplic-
ity led to a rule that required substantial judicial amendment, resulting in unpredictability of 
outcome. See Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 
JI, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1941-43 (1989). As amended in 1983, Rule 11, though simple in a 
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Of course, reforms undertaken in the name of simplicity sometimes 
succeed. The "notice pleading'' system of the Federal Rules was, in 
fact, simpler than its common law and code predecessors and that sim-
plicity produced some beneficial effects. Not only did a generalized, 
nontechnical pleading system save the time and money previously 
spent distinguishing among facts, ultimate facts, evidence, and law,268 
it also allowed for new legal theories to be formulated without the 
constraints of preexisting legal categories.269 Ironically, however, the 
absence of constraints and categories in the pleading rules - their 
simple, streamlined shape270 - has ultimately made practice under 
them surprisingly complex. Local rules, 271 standing orders, referral to 
masters and magistrates, 272 and judicial discretion to impose sanctions 
for abuse of the rules273 have all become part of the pleading 
package.274 
Reformers may need a vision to propel them forward, to buoy 
them up when support for their reforms is not immediately forthcom-
ing. Aesthetic goals can fill such a need. The history of scientific, 
political and social reforms proves that proposition. 275 In addition, 
formal sense, did not have simplicity of implementation as a stated goal; it was anticipated that 
judges would need to use their discretion and tailor different sanctions to meet the needs of 
different cases. Id. at 1936-37, 1943. 
Rule 11 illustrates one respect in which simplicity plays a different role in procedural reform 
than it does in science. Simple scientific rules and formulas exist against an elaborate definitional 
background where basic units of measurement - the cell, the atom and so forth - are com-
monly understood and form the basis of future developments. The simplicity of Einstein's theory 
of relativity derives from its ability to unite the complex strands of prior scientific thought into a 
single, harmonious construct. In procedure, however, the units of measurement have not always 
remained constant. Many basic concepts - claims, causes of action, facts, notice, sanctions -
have been left deliberately general in the interest of simplicity and have shifted in meaning and 
importance over time. Procedural reforms thus cannot be expected to reflect an order that does 
not exist nor to organize and harmonize a universe of parts that are themselves not clearly 
defined. 
268. See Subrin, supra note 123, at 338-39. 
269. See Hazard, supra note 266, at 2246. 
270. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. 
271. See Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and 
Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999 (1989). 
272. See Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited.· The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 
U. PA. L. REv. 2131 (1989). 
273. See Burbank, supra note 267, at 1941-43. 
274. This has led some commentators to question the wisdom of future reforms based on 
"simpler is better'' as an article of faith. See, e.g., Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The 
Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 716-17 & n.172 
(1988) (urging recognition of the limitations of broad, generalized rules); Kaplan, supra note 13, 
at 2126-27, (posing questions in need of further study regarding differentiated modes of proce-
dure); Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. 
L. REv. 2197, 2211-12 (1989) (proposing different procedural tracks for different kinds of cases); 
Subrin, supra note 271, at 2048-51 (demonstrating that case-specific rules already exist). 
275. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. 
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aesthetic goals are worthy ones, capturing the best of human aspira-
tions and potential.276 Where procedural reform is concerned, how-
ever, becoming preoccupied by aesthetic sensibilities may cause one to 
be tricked into thinking that the shape of a rule alters the shape of the 
human transaction it is meant to control or facilitate, rather than vice 
versa. An aesthetic perception of or attitude toward procedure can 
make it an end in itself, divorced from the substantive world in which 
the effects of procedure are realized. An early critic of the Enabling 
Act described this phenomenon in a salient metaphor: "If a group of 
mariners tired of studying their complicated charts should decide to 
throw them away and adopt more simple maps, they would not 
thereby do away with the air and water currents through which they 
must pass, or the icebergs or the reefs in their course."277 
While aesthetic sensibilities and goals need not be absent from the 
process of procedural reform - indeed, they have been at least partly 
responsible for important procedural advances - they need to be ap-
propriately contained. Experience teaches that simpler is not always 
better. Complexity will not vanish in the face of simple rules; it will 
just go elsewhere, necessitating steps that may be at odds with the 
original streamlined system. 21s 
Recognizing both that aesthetic factors are present in procedural 
reform and that their role must be limited is a useful first step in ensur-
ing that aesthetic goals do not blind reformers to the social, political, 
and institutional effects of the changes they propose.279 Simplicity is 
not bad. In law, as in science and other fields, the rhetoric of simplic-
ity has propelled, and may continue to propel, positive change. But its 
limitations must be recognized and other visions pursued. In particu-
lar, the reality of the universe within which procedure operates de-
serves attention. Based on what we know and can discover,280 there 
276. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text. 
277. Hall, Uniform Law Procedure in Federal Courts, 33 W. VA. L.Q. 131, 134 (1927). Inter-
est in Connor Hall's critical perspective was inspired by Stephen Subrin. See Subrin, supra note 
17, at 994-95; see also Burbank, supra note 267, at 1941 n.89. 
278. Professor Subrin has noted that simple, general rules almost inevitably engender specific 
ones. He points to both the elaborate additions to the Field Code and the proliferation of local 
rules under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as examples of this phenomenon. See Subrin, 
supra note 271, at 2045-46. 
279. There are other aesthetic preferences besides simplicity and, as in art, prevailing notions 
of what is pleasing can change over time. In fact, a whole set of aesthetic values is invoked by the 
concept of complexity. In art, these include richness and depth of design, the incorporation of 
diverse materials, and variety of significance in line and shape. See supra notes 39-45 and accom· 
panying text. Applied to the procedural realm, such notions could provide an alternative or 
additional aesthetic impetus for reforms to come. 
280. The need for empirical research on procedure has long been recognized but has re· 
mained largely unmet. See, e.g., Burbank, Introduction: "Plus <;a Change. • • ?'~ 21 U. MICH. 
J.L. REF. 509, 512 (1988); Burbank, supra note 267, at 1939-40; Galanter, The Federal Rules and 
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may emerge a new aesthetic vision that, while not totally abandoning 
simplicity, recognizes and values the complexity, difference and partic-
ularity inherent in today's world. This new vision may form the basis 
of a new rhetoric of procedural reform which, in turn, may prompt 
fresh, as yet untried structures and ideas for procedural change. 
the Quality of Settlements: A Comment on Rosenberg's, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
Action, 137 u. PA. L. REV. 2231, 2235-36 (1989). 
